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Definitions and explanatory notes

Statistics published in this Review are taken from government sources and published data. No use is made of confidential information obtained by bp in the course of its business

The conversion factors cover calculation between weight, volume and calorific measures. They provide data for crude oil, products, natural gas, LNG, electricity and solid fuels.

Total proved reserves of oil – generally taken to be those quantities that geological and engineering information indicates with reasonable certainty can be recovered in the future from known reservoirs under existing conditions.

The total oil reserves estimates have been compiled using a combination of primary official sources, third-party data from the OPEC Secretariat, World Oil, Oil & Gas Journal and an Chinese reserves based on official data and information in the public domain. Canadian oil sands ‘under active development’ are an official estimate. Venezuelan Orinoco Belt reserves are based on the OPEC Secretariat and government announcements. Reserves and R/P ratio for Canada includes Canadian oil sands. Reserves and R/P ratio includes the Orinoco belt. Saudi Arabia’s reserves include NGL’s from 2017. Reserves include gas condensate and natural gas liquids (NGLs) as well as crude oil.

The data series for proved oil in this year’s Review does not necessarily meet the definitions, guidelines and practices used for determining proved reserves at company level, for instance, as published by the US Securities and Exchange Commission nor does it necessarily represent bp’s view of proved reserves by country.

For more information please see oil reserves definitions.

Total proved reserves of natural gas – generally taken to be those quantities that geological and engineering information indicates with reasonable certainty can be recovered in the future from known reservoirs under existing conditions. The data series for proved gas reserves in this years Review does not necessarily meet the definitions, guidelines and practices used for determining proved reserves at company level, for instance as published by the US Securities and Exchange Commission nor does it necessarily represent bp’s view of proved reserves by country.

The total natural gas reserves estimates have been compiled using a combination of primary official sources and third party data from Cedigaz and the OPEC Secretariat.

Total proved reserves of coal – generally taken to be those quantities that geological and engineering information indicates with reasonable certainty can be recovered in the future from known reservoirs under existing conditions.

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Statistical Review of World Energy 2021 ‎–‎ Spencer Dale

Spencer Dale, chief economist

Statistical Review of World Energy 2021 launch, London

Introduction

Thank you for joining us for the launch of this year’s bp Statistical Review of World Energy.

The good news is that we are back broadcasting from bp’s office in St James, London.

Last September, we launched bp’s new Energy Outlook from a very fancy film studio, with all sorts of illuminated backdrops and 3D-effects.

All great – until the lights went out and we went off air for 10 minutes.

Sometimes there’s a lot to be said for the old and trusted – more on that in a minute.

The bad news, we couldn’t invite all of you to join us in person today.

Although life in the UK is gradually getting back to normal, lockdown restrictions still haven’t been fully lifted. So, thank you for joining us virtually.

I would also like to thank all the team, both here at bp and at Herriot Watt University – our long-term partners on the Statistical Review – for their tremendous hard work and dedication in compiling this year’s Statistical Review.

Producing the Statistical Review is never the easiest of tasks, but – I think it’s fair to say – that doing so whilst working remotely under lockdown made it even more ‘exciting’.

So, a huge thanks to everyone involved.

This is the 70th anniversary of the bp Statistical Review – something we are incredibly proud of.

Since it was first published in 1952, the Statistical Review has provided a constant source of objective, comprehensive – and, most importantly – trusted data to help industry, governments and commentators make sense of developments in global energy markets.

Over those 70 years, the Statistical Review has borne witness to some of the most dramatic episodes in the history of the global energy system:

All moments of great turmoil in global energy.

But all pale in comparison to the events of last year.

Most importantly, the pandemic that engulfed the world last year is a humanitarian tragedy.

As of last week, around 4 million people were reported to have died as a result of COVID-19.

The true number is likely to be far higher, and it continues to rise.

The pandemic also led to huge economic loss.

Global GDP is estimated to have fallen by over 3.5% last year – the largest peacetime recession since the Great Depression.

The IMF estimate that around 100 million people have been pushed into poverty as a result of the virus.

And the economic scarring from the pandemic – especially for the world’s poorest and least-developed economies – is expected to persist for many years after the virus is brought under control.

Long COVID can take many different forms.

For the global energy system, the combination of the pandemic, together with efforts to mitigate its impact, led to developments and outturns unmatched in modern peacetime.

For energy, 2020 was a year like no other.

The aim for today is to use the new Statistical Review data to try to shed light on those developments. I plan to focus the discussion on three questions.

In that context, I am delighted to say that, for the second part of today’s launch, there will be a panel discussion to consider these issues.

We are extremely lucky to have three highly expert guests to lead that discussion:

And we have an equally distinguished guest to chair the panel and pose the questions – Gillian Tett from the Financial Times.

Y ou will have an opportunity to put your questions to the panel, so please stay tuned.

Energy in 2020: what happened and how surprising was it?

But ahead of that, the three questions about energy in the year of COVID.

Starting first with what actually happened last year and how surprising was it?

The headline numbers are dramatic: world energy demand is estimated to have fallen by 4.5% and global carbon emissions from energy use by 6.3%.

These falls are huge by historical standards – the largest falls in both energy demand and carbon emissions since WWII.

Indeed, the fall of over 2 Gt of CO2 means that carbon emissions last year were back to levels last seen in 2011.

It’s also striking that the carbon intensity of the energy mix – the average carbon emitted per unit of energy used – fell by 1.8%, also one of the largest ever falls in post-war history.

How should we think about these reductions?

From a historical perspective, the falls in energy demand and carbon emissions are obviously dramatic.

But from a forward-looking perspective, the rate of decline in carbon emissions observed last year is similar to what the world needs to average each and every year for the next 30 years to be on track to meet the Paris climate goals.

Put more concretely, if carbon emissions declined at the same average rate as last year for the next 30 years, global carbon emissions would decline by around 85% by 2050.

For those of you familiar with bp’s latest Energy Outlook, that is roughly mid-way between the Rapid and Net Zero scenarios, which are broadly consistent with maintaining global temperature rises well below 2oC and below 1.5oC respectively.

Last year’s fall in carbon emissions was obviously driven by the huge loss in economic output and activity.

The challenge is to reduce emissions without causing massive disruption and damage to everyday lives and livelihoods.

It’s interesting to ask how surprising the falls in energy demand and carbon emissions were last year.

Yes: they were the biggest falls seen for 75 years.

But they occurred against the backdrop of a global pandemic and the largest economic recession in post-war history.

So how surprising were they given everything else that was going on?

The yellow ‘predicted’ line in Chart 2 is based on the same simple framework which we used in the 2019 Statistical Review to analyse movements in energy demand.

The framework uses GDP growth, changes in oil prices (as a proxy for energy prices), and the number of unusually hot and cold days to predict the growth of energy demand at a country level and then aggregates to global energy.

The neat thing about the framework is that, despite being embarrassingly simple, it can explain most of the broad contours in energy demand over the past 20 years or so.

The key feature of last year’s fall in energy demand is that it was surprisingly big.

Even after controlling for the collapse in economic activity, the decline in energy demand was close to twice the size of the ‘predicted’ fall: 4.5% compared with a predicted fall of around 2.5%.

The source of this surprise can be better understood by looking at the size of the falls in the different components of energy demand.

Oil demand is estimated to have fallen by an unprecedented 9.3% (9.1 million barrels/day, or Mb/d) in 2020 – far bigger than anything seen in history and far bigger than the falls in the other demand components.

Indeed, the fall in oil demand accounts for around three-quarters of the total decline in energy consumption.

It’s also the key factor accounting for the near-record fall in the carbon intensity of the energy mix.

The yellow bars in Chart 4 use a similar modelling approach to derive predicted movements for each of the demand components.

As you can see, the fall in oil consumption in 2020 was far bigger than expected based on past relationships.

And the extent of that discrepancy was far greater than for any of the other demand components.

The decline in natural gas was pretty much bang-in-line with the model prediction and electricity consumption actually fell by less than predicted. Indeed, for those of you who like to think in statistical terms, the only statistically significant prediction errors were those for total energy demand and oil demand.

And the surprise in total energy demand can be entirely explained by the greater-than-expected fall in oil demand.

Of course, for all of us who experienced extended lockdowns last year, this is hardly surprising.

The lockdowns detracted from oil demand in a completely different way to a normal economic downturn, crushing transport-related demand.

Mobility metrics fell across the board.

Use of jet fuel and kerosene is estimated to have plunged by 40% (3.2 Mb/d) as aviation across much of the world was grounded.

Similarly, gasoline demand fell by around 13% (3.1 Mb/d) as road mobility measures crashed.

In contrast, products most closely related to the petrochemicals sector (naphtha, ethane and LPG) were broadly flat, supported in part by increasing demand for PPE and other medical- and hygiene-related supplies.

In comparison, natural gas showed far greater resilience.

Gas demand is estimated to have fallen by 2.3% (81 Bcm) in 2020, a broadly similar decline to that seen in 2009 in the aftermath of the financial crisis.

The relative immunity of natural gas was helped by sharp falls in gas prices, which allowed gas generation to gain share in the US power market and hold its own in the EU.

Electricity consumption is estimated to have experienced the smallest fall across the main components of final energy demand, declining by just 0.9% in 2020.

The relative resilience of electricity usage was aided by the nature of the lockdowns, with falling power demand in industry and commercial buildings partially offset by increased domestic use by home-based workers and locked-down families.

The relative resilience of overall power generation disguises a more significant shift in the generation mix.

In particular, despite the fall in overall power demand, generation from renewables (wind, solar, bioenergy and geothermal energy, and excluding hydroelectricity) recorded its largest ever increase (358 TWh)

This growth was driven by strong increases in both wind (173 TWh) and solar (148 TWh) generation.

Encouragingly, the share of renewables in global generation recorded its fastest ever increase.

That continues the strong growth seen in recent years.

Over the past five years, renewable generation has accounted for around 60% of the growth in global power generation, with wind and solar power more than doubling.

In addition to falling power demand and increasing deployment of renewables, coal was also hurt by a loss of competitiveness relative to natural gas, especially in the US and EU.

These trends are exactly what the world needs to see as it transitions to net zero: strong growth in renewable generation crowding out coal.

That said, the ‘more than doubling’ in wind and solar generation over the past five years hasn’t made even the smallest dent in total coal generation.

The level of coal generation in 2020 was essentially unchanged from its level in 2015 as last year’s fall simply offset increases from the previous few years.

It will take more than just strong growth in renewable energy to remove coal from the global power sector, especially at the pace it needs to happen.

As highlighted by Chart 8, there is still a long way to go to squeeze coal out of the power sector.

And, as we highlighted in the 2020 Energy Outlook, for many emerging market economies to make significant inroads into the role of coal while still ensuring improving energy access, they will likely need to see an expansion in natural gas alongside renewable energy over the next 15-20 years.

Finally, in terms of this section, how ‘surprising’ was last year’s fall in carbon emissions?

Or put differently, what message should we take from this fall for future carbon trends?

Is this the beginning of the much hoped-for downward trend in emissions or just a temporary COVID-induced dip?

The two elements combining to produce the near-record decline in carbon emissions – the falls in energy demand and in the carbon intensity of the energy mix – can both be largely traced back to the unprecedented decline in oil demand triggered by the lockdowns.

This suggests that as lockdowns around the world are eased and economic activity begins to recover, there is a significant risk that last year’s fall in carbon emissions will be reversed.

Indeed, the IEA recently estimated that the level of carbon emissions last December was already back above pre-crisis levels.

What can we learn from the COVID-induced stress test?

Moving to the second question for today: what can we learn from the behaviour of the energy system in response to the extreme stress test induced by the pandemic?

The focus here is on the supply response: how did different parts of the energy industry react to the sudden, unexpected fall in demand?

As I have already mentioned, it’s striking that the relentless expansion of renewable energy was relatively unscathed by the pandemic.

And I will say more about the good news story which is renewables later.

For now, I am going to concentrate on oil and natural gas markets which were affected more severely by the events of last year.

Moreover, oil and natural gas markets could become increasingly challenged as the energy transition gathers pace.

So, it’s interesting to ask whether we can learn anything about their future behaviour from their response to the stresses of last year?

Starting first with oil.

Over the year as a whole, global oil production is estimated to have fallen by 6.6 Mb/d – again the largest fall in post-war history.

To get a sense of the timing and composition of that supply response it is helpful to split the year into three phases.

Phase 1 covers the onset of the global pandemic from December 2019 to April 2020.

This is the period in which global oil consumption literally collapsed, with demand reaching a trough in April of more than 20 Mb/d below pre-COVID-19 levels.

Off the charts relative to anything seen in history.

The initial supply response was totally underwhelming.

In fact, it was counterproductive.

The obvious source of supply that could react quickly was OPEC.

But as you know, the key OPEC+ meeting in early March ended in disagreement, with supply actually increasing for a period as a brief price war broke out.

Oil inventories accumulated at a record pace, increasing by around 750 million barrels in just four months.

That scale of imbalance is unheard of and generated severe logistical issues, in terms of both the availability of storage and the ability of excess supplies to access storage sufficiently quickly.

Prices responded accordingly.

And oil markets made frontpage news as US WTI prices turned negative for the first time ever.

The second phase, from April to August, saw a significant supply response.

The main supply reaction came from OPEC+, who agreed to cut oil production by 9.7 Mb/d between May and June, later extended to July.

US tight oil also responded, with production falling by around 2 Mb/d between March and May.

The responsiveness of tight oil is typically framed in terms of the rapid decline rates in tight oil basins combined with the speed with which new investment can be halted.

But the pace of response seen in the US last spring was far quicker than natural decline, and was largely driven by producing wells being shut-in, due to a combination of logistics and economics.

The falls in US tight oil were compounded by falls in conventional supplies.

All told, North American production fell by around 4 Mb/d between March and May – roughly twice that of Russia.

At the same time, demand partially recovered as lockdowns were eased, initially in Asia and increasingly in the US and Europe.

This resulted in a convergence of production and consumption levels, with inventories broadly stable at their new elevated level.

The third and final phase, from August through to the end of the year, was one of gradual adjustment.

Demand continued to edge up, although second waves of COVID-19 spreading across different regions slowed the pace of recovery.

Some of the supply response, from both OPEC+ and US tight oil, was partially unwound.

But continuing OPEC+ constraint and compliance meant the market moved into deficit and stocks began to normalize.

By the end of the year, around half of the excess stocks accumulated during the first part of the year had been unwound.

What lessons can we draw from this real-world stress test of global oil markets?

For me, the main lesson was OPEC+ was both able and willing to step in and stabilise oil markets.

But whether this means it will always be able to do so, depends on the type of shock affecting oil markets.

The nature of OPEC’s power to shift supply intertemporally from one period to another means it has the ability to offset temporary, short-lived shocks.

Indeed, in response to an economics exam question of what type of demand shock is OPEC best able to stabilise – a global pandemic followed by a successful vaccine would be close to the perfect answer.

Relatively short-lived, temporary shocks.

Which is what makes the initial failure of OPEC to reach agreement in March 2020 all the more surprising.

In contrast, the ability – and incentive – for OPEC to offset a sustained and growing fall in oil demand as the world transitions to net zero is less clear.

In this case, there may be a greater incentive for individual OPEC members to worry more about protecting and growing their market shares and less about stabilising markets.

Turning to natural gas markets.

I want to focus here on the European gas market, both because it’s the largest market in which there is active gas-on-gas competition; and because of the key role it plays as the balancing market for LNG cargoes.

So, what can we learn from its behaviour in response to the stress caused by the pandemic, with European gas imports falling by over 8 ½ % last year?

The gas-on-gas competition in Europe takes the form of pipeline imports – predominantly from Russia – competing against LNG imports – largely from the US as the marginal source of LNG.

As LNG imports have increased in recent years it has raised the question of the extent to which Russia and other pipeline gas exporters will compete against LNG to maintain their market share or instead forgo some of that share to avoid driving prices too low.

This issue could become more acute in a transition, in which Europe moves away from natural gas and competition between different gas supplies intensifies.

Although there is lots of complicating detail, it appears that Russian exporters were prepared to forgo some market share last year.

Pipeline imports from Russia as a share of European gas demand fell from 35% in 2019 to 31% in 2020, with much of the reduction happening in the first half of last year.

Some of that reduction initially reflected the record storage levels which had been built up towards the end of 2019.

But Russian volumes remained low through the second quarter when the impact of the pandemic on European gas demand was at its height.

In contrast, LNG imports were up year-on-year in the first half of 2020 and their share of European demand for the year as a whole was broadly unchanged at 21%.

However, as to whether this provides a guide to the future behaviour of Russian pipeline exports is less clear.

The argument here is similar to the point we just discussed in the context of OPEC.

In response to a fall in demand that is expected to be relatively short-lived, it may be entirely rational for pipeline exporters to use their flexibility to reduce supply temporarily to help stabilise the market and support prices.

But the possible response to a sustained and growing contraction in gas imports as Europe transitions away from fossil fuels could be very different, with a stronger incentive for Russian pipeline exporters to compete to be the last producer standing.

One of the factors affecting the response of pipeline exporters last year was their perception of how low European prices would need to fall to shut-in LNG exports.

Which takes us to the second aspect I mentioned, Europe as the balancing market for LNG flows.

Until last year, this question of the shut-in price for LNG exports was largely hypothetical – shut ins had never really occurred at scale.

That all changed last year.

Chart 12 shows a highly simplified view of US LNG exporters’ short-run operating costs.

As European LNG forward prices fell below these operating costs, this triggered a significant shut in of US LNG exports.

Average utilization rates of US LNG facilities began to fall in April last year, reaching a low of around 30-35% at the height of the summer.

US LNG exports still increased by around 30% in 2020 helped by three new LNG trains coming on stream and several others ramping up.

But had it not been for the cancelling of cargoes, the growth in US exports would have been closer to 80%.

Progress since Paris – how is the world doing?

Finally for today, with the build-up to the Glasgow COP gathering pace, I want to spend a few minutes putting last year’s developments into the broader context of progress made since the Paris COP in 2015.

The goals agreed at Paris are widely seen as a watershed in terms of achieving global alignment on ambitions for limiting temperature rises and all countries agreeing to make their contribution to achieving those aims.

So almost six years on from Paris, how is the world doing?

One of the biggest changes since 2015 is the marked increase in focus and ambition on getting to net zero.

At the time of the Paris convention, no major country had made a formal commitment to achieve net zero.

That accolade went to Sweden, who in June 2017, pledged to reach carbon neutrality by 2045.

Fast-forward to today, ten countries together with the European Union have passed net zero targets into law and a further 34 countries have either proposed legislation or outlined formal policy intentions with the same intent.

The IEA recently estimated that together these commitments and intentions account for around 70% of global carbon emissions.

Although still early days, there are encouraging signs that the collective jolt and huge costs of COVID may have led to renewed determination to prevent an even-more damaging global trauma in the form of climate change.

That rising level of ambition is also evident at the corporate level.

On last count, the number of companies with stated aims or ambitions to get to net zero had increased more than six-fold since 2019 to more than 3000 companies.

This rise in corporate ambition has coincided with growing societal expectations for companies to both increase further their transparency about climate-related risks and demonstrate their strategies and actions are consistent with Paris.

One manifestation of those changing societal expectations is the explosion in ESG-related investments.

The world of investing seems to have changed for good – in both senses of the word.

Although these developments are hugely encouraging, they come with two major caveats.

First, countries’ pledges still don’t go far enough.

Despite the substantial increase in net zero aims and intentions at national and regional levels, the UN NDC Synthesis Report, published last December, concluded that ‘the current levels of climate ambition are not on track to meet our Paris Agreement goals’.

Second, there is a mismatch between these ambitions and the outcomes the world needs and wants to see.

The Paris agreement was met with huge hope and optimism, but that hasn’t yet been reflected in a marked improvement in the actual emissions data.

Chart 14 is based on the IEA’s World Energy Outlook (WEO) published in November 2015, just prior to the Paris COP.

T he 2015 WEO contained three scenarios for carbon emissions based on different assumptions about the future setting of global energy policies: a continuation of current policies (in red); the implementation of declared policy intentions (in green); and a set of policies consistent with limiting global temperature increases to 2oC (in purple).

Until last year, carbon emissions had continued their unrelenting rise, broadly in line with the policy intentions that had been declared prior to the Paris meeting.

Importantly, there was no sign of the decisive shift envisaged by the ‘less than 2oC’ purple scenario.

The COVID-induced fall in carbon emissions last year put emissions closer to the 2-degree pathway, but as discussed earlier, there is a good chance that much of that dip proves transitory.

Hope and ambition need to be translated into tangible, concrete differences.

Although much of the attention of the Paris Agreement is on the response to climate change, the Agreement stipulates that this response should be in ‘the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty’.

The UN Sustainable Development Goals for 2030 (UN SDGs), which were adopted around the same time as the Paris COP, provide a natural benchmark for monitoring progress on this aspect of the Paris Agreement.

But perhaps the closest to home is SDG 7: ‘ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all’.

The good news is that there have been significant improvements in energy access over the past six years.

The number of people without access to electricity has fallen from close to 1 billion in 2015, to a little over 750 million by 2019.

Around 10% of the world’s population, down from 15% in 2015.

However, just as with emissions, the progress comes with caveats.

The improvements have been uneven, with three-quarters of the global population without access to electricity situated in sub-Saharan Africa.

Moreover, the impact of COVID has reversed some of that progress.

The World Bank estimate that the pandemic has made basic electricity services unaffordable for 30 million more people, the first time the number of people without access to electricity has increased for six years.

Moreover, the concept of ‘energy access’ is somewhat nebulous.

The UN defines access to electricity in terms of a minimum level of residential consumption.

But the level of energy needed to support strong, sustainable economic growth is likely to far exceed that.

Energy is vital for productive uses as well as household consumption.

For example, the Energy for Growth Hub propose a Modern Energy Minimum of 1000 kWh per person per year, which they argue is consistent with countries reaching a lower-middle income status.

This is around four times greater than the UN definition.

Importantly, the Energy for Growth Hub estimates that more than 3.5 billion people – close to half the world’s population – are living below the Modern Energy Minimum.

Half the world’s population.

So, lots more to do in terms of energy access.

Arguably, the single most important element of the energy system needed to address both aspects of the Paris Agreement – respond to the threat of climate change and support sustainable growth – is the need for rapid growth in renewable energy.

I am pleased to say that the progress on renewable energy over the past five or six years has been a perfect example of that tangible, concrete progress I mentioned.

If we start with what happened last year, focussing on wind and solar energy which is where most of the action is.

Despite the huge disruptions associated with the global pandemic and the collapse in GDP, wind and solar capacity increased by a colossal 238 GW in 2020 – 50% larger than at any time in history.

The main driver was China, which accounted for roughly half of the global increase in wind and solar capacity.

The expansion in Chinese wind capacity (72 GW) is particularly striking and it’s likely that some of the reported increase reflects various changes to Chinese subsidy and accounting practices.

But even controlling for that, it seems clear that 2020 was a record year for the build-out of wind and solar capacity.

Viewed over a slightly longer period, wind and solar capacity more than doubled between 2015 and 2020, increasing by around 800 GW, which equates to an average annual increase of 18%.

To put that in context, in bp’s Rapid and Net Zero scenarios, wind and solar capacity increase at an average annual rate of around 14% and 18% respectively over the next 10 years.

So, the current pace of growth is broadly on track with those scenarios.

The challenge is to maintain the recent pace of growth as the overall size of renewable energy expands.

In that context, what has underpinned the strong growth over the past five years?

Along with many other forecasters, we materially underestimated the growth of wind and solar power over the past five years.

Chart 17 compares the profiles for installed capacity of wind and solar power in bp’s 2016 Energy Outlook with the actual outturns.

A key factor underpinning this under-estimation is that costs of renewable energy have fallen by far more than we projected in 2016.

The costs of onshore wind and solar power have fallen by around 40% and 55% respectively over the past five years.

Far more than the 15% and 20% assumed in the 2016 Outlook.

Although it’s a gross simplification, cost reductions for renewables are often summarized in terms of a ‘learning-by-doing’ framework.

As ever-increasing amounts of renewable capacity are produced and installed, the supply chain learns how to become more and more efficient, driving costs progressively lower.

Viewed in this way, renewable costs can fall by more than expected, either because the build out of renewables is greater – hence allowing for ‘more learning’ – or because costs fall by more for a given level of build-out – ‘faster learning’.

As shown in chart 18, the biggest factor accounting for the larger-than-expected falls in renewables costs is ‘faster learning’ – which explains around three-quarters of the error on wind costs and two-thirds for solar costs.

Interestingly, the majority of the ‘more learning’ contributions for both wind and solar over the past 5 years stem from China, as renewables have gained share from coal more quickly than expected.

This transition has gone hand-in-hand with a massive scaling up of China’s renewable manufacturing capacity, which has helped reduce the cost of wind and solar power around the world.

So, an upbeat message on renewables.

Continued rapid growth in renewable energy is necessary to get to net zero, but it’s not sufficient.

Conclusion

70th birthdays are important milestones, providing an opportunity to reflect on the events that have shaped your life.

There have certainly been many, many changes in global energy markets since the Statistical Review was first conceived in 1952.

But as my mother-in-law said to me recently, even at 70 you can still be surprised.

And for the Statistical Review – like so many of us – 2020 will go down as one of the most surprising and most dramatic years in its life.

With the largest declines in energy demand and carbon emissions seen in modern peacetime.

But the importance of the past 70 years pales into insignificance as we consider the challenges facing the energy system over the next 10, 20, 30 years as the world strives to get to net zero.

Will 2020 be seen as a turning point when the shock of COVID-19 finally caused the world to take decisive action to mitigate the threat of climate change?

Will the good intentions and increased ambitions of the past few years be translated into a sharp and sustained fall in emissions?

Will renewable energy be able to maintain the rapid rates of growth seen over the past five-years?

And how important will the private sector – in the form of green and greening companies, prompted and supported by growing societal expectations – be in the eventual success or otherwise of the energy transition?

If 70th birthdays are important, 100-year anniversaries are really special.

What events will the 100-year-old Statistical Review report as it analyses energy developments in 2050?

To discuss some of these issues – and I am sure many more – let me pass you over to Gillian Tett of the FT to introduce you to our panellists for the next part of today’s launch.

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Annex

The many uncertainties mean that the probability of any one of these scenarios materializing exactly as described is negligible. Moreover, the three scenarios do not provide a comprehensive description of all possible outcomes. However, they do span a wide range of possible outcomes and so might help to inform a judgement about the uncertainty surrounding energy markets out to 2050.

The Outlook was largely prepared before the military action by Russia in Ukraine and does not include any analysis of the possible implications of those developments on economic growth or global energy markets.

The Energy Outlook is produced to inform bp’s strategy and is published as a contribution to the wider debate about the factors shaping the energy transition. But the Outlook is only one source among many when considering the future of global energy markets and bp considers a wide range of other external scenarios, analysis and information when forming its long-term strategy.

The content published in this initial version of the Outlook summarizes some of the key highlights and findings from the updated scenarios. More detailed material is planned to be released in the future.

The world’s scientific community has developed a number of “integrated assessment models” (IAMs) that attempt to represent interactions between human systems (the economy, energy, agriculture) and climate. They are “simplified, stylized, numerical approaches to represent enormously complex physical and social systems” (Clarke 2014). These models have been used to generate many scenarios, exploring possible long-run trajectories for greenhouse gas emissions and climate change under a wide range of assumptions.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) carries out regular surveys of this scenario modelling as part of its assessment work. The most recent survey was carried out in support of the IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C (SR15). A total of 414 scenarios from 13 different modelling frameworks were compiled and made available via an online portal hosted at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA).

Some of the scenarios are now quite dated and, in some cases, scenario results are already significantly out of line with recent historical data and so were excluded from our analysis. From the remaining model runs, 112 scenarios were judged to be consistent with the Paris climate change agreement of holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. These scenarios were further divided into two subsets: “well below 2°C” (69 scenarios); and “1.5°C with no or low overshoot” (43 scenarios).

It is important to note that the scenario dataset represents a collection of scenarios that were available at the time of the IPCC survey, and which were produced for a variety of purposes. “It is not a random sampling of future possibilities of how the world economy should decarbonize” (Gambhir et al, 2019). That means that the distributions of IPCC scenarios cannot be interpreted as reliable indicators of likelihood of what might actually happen. Rather, the distributions simply describe the characteristics of the scenarios contained in the IPCC report.

In addition to this selection of scenarios, the Comparison with IPPC Pathways chart shows the emissions path for a representative scenario based on the information available in Table 2.4 in the IPCC report ‘Mitigation Pathways Compatible with 1.5°C in the Context of Sustainable Development.’ This path is constructed using the median level of CO₂ from fossil fuels and industry (net) in 2030 and the average decline of emissions in 2010-2030 and 2020-2030 for 42 scenarios consistent with 1.5°C with no or limited overshooting.

References

The GDP profiles used in the Energy Outlook come from Oxford Economics (OE). These long-term forecasts incorporate estimates of the economic impact of climate change. These estimates draw on the latest research in the scientific literature and follow a similar methodology to that used in Energy Outlook 2020.

OE updated and extended the models developed by Burke, Hsiang and Miguel (2015), which use the IPCC Representative Concentration Pathways (RCP) scenarios to assess the impact of temperature changes on GDP. Like Burke et al., OE’s updated results find evidence of a non-linear relationship between productivity and temperature, in which per capita income growth rises to an average (population weighted) temperature of just under 15°C (Burke et al’s initial assessment was 13°C). This temperature curve suggests that ‘cold country’ income growth increases with annual temperatures. However, at annual temperatures above 15°C, per capita income growth is increasingly adversely affected by higher temperatures.

The OE forecasts are broadly in line with the RCP 6.0 scenario and assume average global temperatures will reach 2°C above pre-industrial levels by 2050. The results suggest that in 2050 global GDP is around 3% lower than in a counterfactual scenario where the temperature change remained at the current level. The regional impacts are distributed according to the evolution of their temperatures relative to the concave function estimated by OE. These estimates are hugely uncertain and incomplete; they do not, for example, explicitly include impact from migration or extensive coastal flooding.

The mitigation costs of actions to decarbonize the energy system are also uncertain, with significant variations across different external estimates. Most estimates, however, suggest that the upfront costs increase with the stringency of the mitigation effort, suggesting that they are likely to be bigger in Accelerated and Net Zero than in New Momentum. Estimates published by the IPCC (AR5 – Chapter 6) suggest that for scenarios consistent with keeping global temperature increases to well below 2°C, median estimates of mitigation costs range between 2-6% of global consumption by 2050.

Given the huge range of uncertainty surrounding estimates of the economic impact of both climate changes and mitigation, and the fact that all three of the main scenarios include both types of costs to a greater or lesser extent, the GDP profiles used in the Outlook are based on the illustrative assumption that these effects reduce GDP in 2050 by around 3% in all three scenarios, relative to the counterfactual in which temperatures are held constant at recent average levels.

Sources

Oil and gas upstream

Implied levels of oil and gas investment are derived from the production levels in each scenario. Upstream oil and natural gas capital expenditure includes well capex (costs related to well construction, well completion, well simulation, steel costs and materials), facility capex (costs to develop, install, maintain, and modify surface installations and infrastructure) and exploration capex (costs incurred to find and prove hydrocarbons). It excludes operating costs and midstream capex such as capex associated with developing LNG liquefaction capacity.

Wind and solar

Wind and solar energy investment requirements are based on the capital expenditure costs associated with the deployment profiles of each technology in each scenario.

Wind and solar deployment profiles include both renewable power capacity for end-use and for green hydrogen production. The deployment profiles also consider the potential impact of curtailment.

Capital expenditure costs are assigned to each scenario based on their historical values and estimated future evolution. They are differentiated by technology, region and scenario using a combination of internal bp estimates and external benchmarking. The capital expenditure figures do not include the incremental wider system integration costs associated with wind and solar deployment.

Carbon capture use and storage

Power sector post-combustion capture costs are based on internal bp estimates drawn from a wide range of sources. Capture costs for industry, heat and hydrogen are based on the 2019 US National Petroleum Council Report Meeting the Dual Challenge: A Roadmap to At-Scale Deployment of Carbon Capture, Use, and Storage. Transportation and storage costs were based on internal expert judgment on primary storage archetype (onshore or offshore) for each region and internal assessment of either pipeline or shipping costs.

CO₂ emissions from industrial processes refer only to non-energy emissions from cement production. CO₂ emissions associated with the production of hydrogen feedstock for ammonia and methanol are included under hydrogen sector emissions.

As in the bp Statistical Review, historical data for natural gas flaring data is taken from VIIRS Nightfire (VNF) data and produced by the Earth Observation Group (EOG), Payne Institute for Public Policy, Colorado School of Mines. The profiles for natural gas flaring in the scenarios assume that flaring moves in line with wellhead upstream output.

Historical data on methane emissions associated with the production, transportation and distribution of fossil fuels are sourced from IEA estimates of greenhouse gas emissions. The profiles for future methane emissions assumed in the scenarios are based on fossil fuel production and take account of recent policy initiatives such as the Global Methane Pledge. The net change in methane emissions is the aggregation of future changes to fossil fuel production and methane intensity.

There is a wide range of uncertainty with respect to both current estimates of methane emissions and the global warming potential of methane emissions. To ensure alignment with financial and government reporting standards, the methane to CO₂e factor used in the scenarios is a 100-year Global Warming Potential (GWP) of 25, recommended by the IPCC in AR4.

Sources

Data definitions are based on the bp Statistical Review of World Energy, unless otherwise noted. Data used for comparisons, including scenarios from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), unless otherwise noted are rebased to be consistent with the bp Statistical Review.

Figures and charts of primary energy are estimated using the substitution method, unless otherwise stated.

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is expressed in terms of real Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) at 2015 prices.

Sectors

Regions

Fuels, energy carriers, carbon and materials

Sources

Forward-looking statements involve risks and uncertainties because they relate to events, and depend on circumstances, that will or may occur in the future. Actual outcomes may differ materially from those expressed in such statements depending on a variety of factors, including: the specific factors identified in the discussions expressed in such statements; product supply, demand and pricing; political stability; general economic conditions; demographic changes; legal and regulatory developments; availability of new technologies; natural disasters and adverse weather conditions; wars and acts of terrorism or sabotage; public health situations including the impacts of an epidemic or pandemic and other factors discussed in this publication. bp disclaims any obligation to update this publication or to correct any inaccuracies which may become apparent. Neither BP p.l.c. nor any of its subsidiaries (nor any of their respective officers, employees and agents) accept liability for any inaccuracies or omissions or for any direct, indirect, special, consequential or other losses or damages of whatsoever kind in or in connection with this publication or any information contained in it.

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Annex

Used for reference by the media, academia, world governments and energy companies, the Statistical Review of World Energy is one of the most widely respected publications in the field of energy economics

The bp Statistical Review of World Energy is the longest-running compilation of global energy statistics available. Over the years, it has become widely recognized as a key source of data on energy markets, useful to business, policy, academia, journalists and the public alike. It seems fair to say that it has become a crucial resource, underpinning discussions about energy or the environment with facts.

The Statistical Review has been published for 71 years and has expanded from a small, typed, paper document of fewer than 10 pages to a comprehensive internet database that can be used for very detailed analysis. Behind the published data are more than 700,000 single data entries – and it is growing each day. The numbers contain the story of energy in the second half of the 20th century and the beginning of this one. They illustrate global transitions in the fuels we use and how we use them, and our preoccupations and concerns about this important element of the global economy.

The printed publication and website (launched originally in 1996) are freely available to all who wish to use them. There is no agenda: it is simply a portrait in numbers of global energy production, consumption, trade, reserves and prices.

Our commemorative 60-year edition provides a bit more of the history of the publication.

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Новый ВР Statistical Review of World Energy 2021

Вышла свежая статистика ВР с данными за 2020 год. ВР Statistical Review of World Energy считается самым авторитетным источником по энергетической статистике. Там даются статистические данные по всем первичным источникам энергии (нефть, газ, уголь, электроэнергия, ВИЭ). Статистика дается по всему миру и по отдельным странам, по отдельным позициям статистика идет с 1965 года.

Свежий выпуск показывает добычу (производство) первичных источников энергии и их потребление. Разница между добычей и потреблением означает экспорт или импорт. Сосредоточимся пока на цифрах, относящихся к нефти и газу.

Как и ожидалось ковидный год сказался на добыче и потреблении: сплошное (за некоторым исключением) падение. Интересно, что цифры падения превосходят цифры 2008-2009 гг.

Нефть добыча

Нефть потребление

Газ добыча

Газ потребление

Вот такие свежие цифры. Как видно, нынешний кризис превзошел 2008 год. Выводы пока делать рано, можно только предварительные, но я пока воздержусь от этого.

Специально для этих дальтоников повторяю в авторском комментарии, чтоб больше не лезли.

Статистика ВР показывает добычу и потребление, разница означает экспорт или импорт. Согласно этой статистике в 2020 году в РФ добыча/потребление нефти составили 524,4/146,3. Разница составляет экспорт (72,1%). Это уже успех, если учитывать, что в за предыдущий период цифра составляла 73,2%. Это с учетом падения добычи на (-8,8%) и потребления (-5,2%). Экспорт включает нефть и нефтепродукты.

Для дальтоников повторяю (чтоб опять не доставали меня) несколько моих выдержек из моих комментов и статей.

Тут некоторые упорно относят нефтепродукты к продуктам «высокого передела», хотя как видно, они строго следуют за нефтью. При этом в прошлом году разрыв в ценах значительно сократился. В экспорте нефтепродуктов основную часть составляю дизель и мазут. Вопрос о принадлежности нефтепродуктов к продуктам «высокого передела» спорный. Например, из этой таблицы следует, что прокат поставляется по цене 480 долл. на тонну, но вот цена самого дешевого мерседеса составит уже 23 тыс. за тонну. Другой пример: алюминий поставляется по цене 1567 за тонну, а простенький Боинг продается по цене уже около 1 млн. за тонну.

сырая нефть (экспорт январь-апрель) тыс.т/млн. долл

67016,4/26891,5 средняя цена 401,3 долл/т

49385,8/20033,1 средняя цена 405,6 долл/т

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Energy economics

The Energy Outlook makes projections to 2050 and beyond, while the Statistical Review of World Energy provides historic data on world energy markets

Energy Outlook – 2022 edition

Focus on the energy transition has intensified in recent years. How has this increase in global ambition shifted the pace of change in the energy system? And what impact will this have on the fuel mix and emissions?

The bp Energy Outlook outlines bp’s views on future global energy markets based on different scenarios through to 2050.

Statistical Review of World Energy 2022

The challenges and uncertainties facing the global energy system are at their greatest for almost 50 years.

bp’s Statistical Review of World Energy 2022 reveals that the growing shortages and increasing prices highlight the continuing importance of energy ‘security’ and ‘affordability’ alongside ‘lower carbon’ when addressing the energy trilemma.

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BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2021

(www.MaritimeCyprus.com) The COVID-19 pandemic had a dramatic impact on energy markets, with both primary energy and carbon emissions falling at their fastest rates since the Second World War. Nevertheless, renewable energy continued to grow, with solar power recording its largest ever increase.

Energy developments

Primary energy consumption fell by 4.5% in 2020 – the largest decline since 1945. The drop in energy consumption was driven mainly by oil, which contributed almost three-quarters of the net decline, although natural gas and coal also saw significant declines.
Wind, solar and hydroelectricity all grew despite the fall in overall energy demand.

By country, the US, India and Russia contributed the largest declines in energy consumption. China posted the largest increase (2.1%), one of only a handful of countries where energy demand grew last year.

Carbon emissions

Carbon emissions from energy use fell by 6.3%, to their lowest level since 2011. As with primary energy, this was the largest decline since the end of World War II.

Global oil production shrank by 6.6 million b/d, with OPEC accounting for two-thirds of the decline. Libya (-920,000 b/d) and Saudi Arabia (-790,000 b/d) saw the largest OPEC declines, while Russia (-1.0 million b/d) and the US (-600,000 b/d) led non-OPEC reductions. Refinery utilization fell by a record 8.0 percentage points to 74.1%,
the lowest level since 1985.

Natural gas

Natural gas consumption fell by 81 billion cubic metres (bcm), or 2.3%. Nevertheless, the share of gas in primary energy continued to rise, reaching a record high of 24.7%.
Declines in gas demand were led by Russia (-33 bcm) and the US (-17 bcm), with China (22 bcm) and Iran (10 bcm) contributing the largest increases.

Inter-regional gas trade reduced by 5.3%, completely accounted for by a 54 bcm (10.9%) drop in pipeline trade.

LNG supply grew by 4 bcm or 0.6%, well below the 10-year average rate of 6.8% p.a. US LNG supply expanded by 14 bcm (29%), but this was partially offset by declines in most other regions, notably Europe and Africa.

Coal consumption fell by 6.2 exajoules (EJ), or 4.2%, led by declines in the US (-2.1 EJ) and India (-1.1 EJ), with OECD coal consumption falling to its lowest level in our data series back to 1965.

China and Malaysia were notable exceptions, increasing their consumption by 0.5 EJ and 0.2 EJ respectively.

Global coal production was down 8.3 EJ (5.2%). As with consumption, production growth in China (1.1 EJ) was outweighed by sharp declines in several countries, including the US (-3.6 EJ), Indonesia (-1.3 EJ) and Colombia (-1.0 EJ).

Renewables, hydro and nuclear

Renewable energy (including biofuels but excluding hydro) rose by 9.7%, slower than the 10-year average (13.4% p.a.) but the increment in energy terms (2.9 EJ) was similar to increases seen in 2017, 2018 and 2019.

Solar electricity rose by a record 1.3 EJ (20%), however, wind (1.5 EJ) provided the largest contribution to renewables growth.

Solar capacity expanded by 127 GW, while wind capacity grew 111 GW – almost double its previous highest annual increase.

China was the largest individual contributor to renewables growth (1.0 EJ), followed by the US (0.4 EJ). Europe, as a region, contributed 0.7 EJ.

Hydroelectricity grew by 1.0%, again led by China (0.4 EJ), while nuclear energy fell 4.1%, driven mainly by declines in France (-0.4 EJ), the US (-0.2 EJ) and Japan (-0.2 EJ).

Electricity

Electricity generation fell by 0.9% – more than the decline in 2009 (-0.5%), the only other year in our data series (which starts in 1985) when electricity demand fell.

The share of renewables in power generation increased from 10.3% to 11.7%, while coal’s share fell 1.3 percentage points to 35.1% – a new low in our data series.

Key minerals

Lithium production fell 4.6% on a drop in Australian output, while Cobalt output rose 2.9% as production in the Democratic Republic of Congo partially recovered from its dip in 2019.

Rare earth metals production expanded by 23.2%, driven by strong growth in Australia and the US.

For even more details, click on below image to download the full report:

For the Statistical Review of World Energy 2020, click HERE

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Highlights From The BP Statistical Review Of World Energy 2021

Earlier this month the BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2o21 was released, covering energy data through 2020. The Review provides a comprehensive picture of supply and demand for major energy sources on a country-level basis. It is a primary data source for numerous companies, government agencies and non-government organizations.

Since its release, I have been busy analyzing the data and creating graphics. I strive to uncover nuggets of information and analyze the data in unique ways. In upcoming articles I will delve deeper into the various energy categories, but today I want to simply provide a high level overview of this year’s Review.

I will add a caveat regarding this year’s review. Typically, the Review gives us a comprehensive summary of energy trends. However, the Covid-19 pandemic really upended the energy markets in 2020, and we shouldn’t extrapolate some of these trends.

For example, as I will detail below, oil demand fell dramatically last year, but we already know that it has largely recovered in 2021. So it would be a serious mistake to think that last year’s plunge marks the beginning of long-term trends.

Energy Overview

Primary global energy consumption fell by 4.5% last year, which was the largest annual decline since 1945. About three-fourths of the decline came from oil, as the pandemic dramatically impacted the world’s transportation systems. Small declines were also reported in coal, natural gas, and nuclear consumption, while renewables and hydropower recorded gains.

However, despite the sharp decline in oil consumption, oil remained on top with a 31.2% share of all energy consumption. The remainder of global energy consumption came from coal (27.2%), natural gas (24.7%), hydropower (6.9%), renewables (5.7%), and nuclear power (4.3%).

Cumulatively, fossil fuels — shown below in shades of gray — still accounted for 83.1% of the world’s primary energy consumption in 2020.

The decline in energy consumption was prevalent throughout the entire world. Over 95% of the countries tracked by the review experienced a decline in energy consumption. By country, the U.S., India, and Russia contributed the largest annual declines in energy consumption.

China was one of the rare exceptions, growing energy consumption by 2.1% over 2019. Still, that was well below China’s 3.8% average growth over the previous 10 years.

Global carbon dioxide emissions fell by 6.3% in 2020. As with energy consumption, this was also the largest decline since 1945, and put annual emissions back at levels last seen in 2011. But, as the report noted, “the rate of decline in carbon emissions last year is similar to what the world needs to average each year for the next 30 years to be on track to meet the aims of the Paris Agreement.”

Oil still accounts for nearly a third of the world’s energy consumption. In 2020, the world consumed 88.5 million barrels per day (BPD) of oil. This was 9.3% lower than consumption in 2019, and was approximately equivalent to 2012 oil consumption levels.

Global oil production fell by 6.6 million BPD in 2020. About two-thirds of the decline came from OPEC countries. U.S. oil production fell by 600,000 BPD, which was the largest annual decline recorded since the fracking boom began.

Natural Gas

Natural gas has been the fastest-growing fossil fuel in recent years, with a global 2.9% average annual growth rate over the past decade.

Nevertheless, natural gas didn’t manage to buck the trend in 2020. Global natural gas consumption declined by 2.3%. This marked the largest decline in natural gas demand on record, and only the third annual decline seen since 1965.

In 2020, the U.S. remained the global leader in both natural gas production and consumption.

Global coal consumption has been on a downward trend since peaking in 2014. The 4.2% decline in coal consumption last year was the largest annual decline on record.

Once again, China bucked the trend, and increased coal consumption by 0.3%. China’s coal consumption remains near all-time high levels, and China remains by far the world’s largest producer and consumer of coal, with a >50% global share in both categories.

Coal demand in OECD countries fell to the lowest level in the history of the Review, which dates to 1965. U.S. coal demand in 2020 also fell to the lowest level since the Review began tracking it in 1965.

Renewables and Nuclear Power

Renewable energy continues to be the growth story in the energy sector. Despite the massive decline in global energy demand, global renewable energy consumption grew by 10% in 2020.

Solar electricity consumption rose by a record 1.3 exajoules (EJ) — an increase of 20% — but wind power (+1.5 EJ) provided the largest contribution to renewables growth.

Last year’s increase in solar and wind capacity was staggering, particularly in light of the pandemic. Solar capacity increased by 127 gigawatts (GW), while wind capacity grew 111 GW. The growth in wind capacity was nearly double the highest prior annual increase. Together, wind and solar power now have a global capacity of 1,441 GW. For perspective, in 2010 that number was 221 GW.

China was the largest individual contributor to renewables growth (1.0 EJ), followed by the U.S. (0.4 EJ). Europe contributed 0.7 EJ.

Nuclear consumption fell in 2020 by 4.1%, but that was on the heels of a rapid increase from the previous year. The U.S. remains the world’s largest consumer of nuclear power, with a 31% share of the global total. South Africa (+13.7%), South Korea (+9.1%), and China (+4.3% had the fastest growth rates in nuclear power in 2020, but China’s consumption increase was the world’s largest.

Summary

As I said near the beginning, we have to take this year’s Review with a grain of salt. We can’t expect the sharp downward trend in fossil fuel consumption to continue, and certainly not at the 2020 pace. As an investor, I would continue to avoid coal companies, but companies that produce, transport, or sell oil and natural gas should fare well for the foreseeable future.

In addition, I think it’s more than obvious that the growth story for wind and solar power has many years to run. This will be especially true if the world continues to electrify its transport systems as expected. There will be a substantial increase in demand for electricity, and renewables will be called upon to bear an increasingly heavy load.

Источник

Columbia | SIPA Center on Global Energy Policy

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bp Statistical Review of World Energy 2021

Get the inside track on a historic year in global energy markets. 2020 was one of the most tumultuous years for global energy in modern history. What actually happened? How surprising was it? What did we learn about the functioning of the energy ‎system and what messages does it contain for the energy transition and the path to net zero?‎

To address the questions above, the Center for Global Energy Policy hosted Spencer Dale, bp Chief Economist, as he presented the findings of bp’s Statistical Review of World Energy 2021. Following his presentation, he joined Laura Cozzi, Chief Energy Modeler, IEA; James Glynn, CGEP Senior Research Scholar; and Meghan O’Sullivan, Jeane Kirkpatrick Professor of the Practice of International Affairs and Director of the Geopolitics of Energy Project, Harvard University’s Kennedy School, on a panel moderated by Jason Bordoff, Co-Founding Dean, Climate School, Columbia University; CGEP Founding Director; and Professor of Professional Practice in International and Public Affairs, Columbia University.

bp’s Statistical Review of World Energy provides an overview of what happened to energy markets in the prior year and a guide to future trends. Perhaps more importantly, it helps us better understand the complex world in which we operate and is considered one of the most widely respected and highly anticipated global energy publications.

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Фейковые единицы измерения в крупном докладе по мировой энергетике

В июне 2016 года британская нефтегазовая группа BP выпустила 65-й «Статистический обзор мировой энергетики» (BP Statistical Review of World Energy) — единственное в мире издание, из года в год публикующее статистические данные по запасам, добыче и спросу всех видов энергоносителей. На эту статистику ссылаются в своих исследованиях ведущие мировые агентства и СМИ, такие как Bloomberg, Financial Times, Коммерсант и другие. Большая часть данных опубликованных в BP Statistical Review приведена в MTOE (Million Tonnes of Oil Equivalent, миллион тонн нефтяного эквивалента). Эти единицы измерения из доклада можно назвать фейковыми, поскольку они обозначаются точно так же как общепринятые MTOE, но их величина отличается примерно в 2,63 раза.
Напомним, что общепринятый MTOE равен 11.63 тераватт-часов (1 toe = 11.63 megawatt-hour (MWh)). Один MTOE из доклада равен примерно 0.38 общепринятых MTOE или 4.42 тераватт-часа.

В результате для читателя данные, представленные в докладе оказываются завышенными в 2.63 раза, если он конечно не читает мелкий шрифт внизу страницы. Там авторы объясняют, хотя и очень коряво, что они используют не общепринятые, а другие единицы измерения, точное значение которых узнать невозможно нигде, а приблизительное значение в 2.63 раза меньше общепринятых. Эти объяснения мелким шрифтом выглядят так:

Это страница А2 отчета по солнечной энергетике. Тут авторы доклада предлагают переводить тераватты в MTOE не по общепринятому коэффициенту 11,63 а по их собственному.

Дальше еще интереснее. Стр.44:

Тут авторы предлагают сжигать на ТЭС не только нефть, а еще и единицы измерения энергии. Школьникам за подобную фразу в контрольной по физике обычно ставят «2».

Далее на странице 41 своего доклада авторы складывают свои фейковые MTOE с тоннами.

Полученный от сложения энергии и массы результат назван «primary energy» и номинирован в MTOE.

В результате получается, что авторам доклада BP с помощью использования фейковых ед. изм. удалось ввести в заблуждение множество мировых аналитиков, журналистов и обычных людей. Например в одной из статей описывается, что мировое потребления угля в 2015 году сократилось на 71 MTOE, что конечно неправда, поскольку автор статьи не читал или не понял мелкий шрифт в докладе BP. На самом деле из доклада следует, что потребление угля сократилось в 2.63 раза меньше (71/2,63=27 MTOE).

Для тех, кто все еще не верит, что крупная международная корпорация может использовать фейковые единицы измерения в своем докладе предлагаю проверить на примере цифр по российской гидроэнергетике, взятых из Википедии. Выработка за 2007 год составила 177 700 000 мегаватт-часов, что в конвертере величин дает 15.3 MTOE. В докладе BP на 36 странице стоит завышенная в несколько раз цифра

В заключение предлагаю читателям проверить и другие цифры из доклада BP, выраженные в MTOE, сравнив их с другими источниками.

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World Electricity Generation

Updated January 2022

Charts shown here use BP data 1 which is the most recent available.

Annual shares

Trends

In the subsequent 17 years from 1996 to 2012, fossil fuels gained share. The share of low-carbon fuels decreased to a minimum of 30%, due to increasing shares of coal and gas (see chart 4). This trend reversed after 2012 and the share of electricity generation from low-carbon fuels in 2020 reached 35% due to wind and solar. This was lower than the 1995 peak, due to the loss of share by nuclear and hydro electricity.

Chart 6 shows that in 2019, the decline of fossil fuels was mainly due to a decline of coal fired electricity generation; gas increased. All forms of low-carbon electricity generation increased.

In 2020, all forms of fossil fuel electricity generation declined, as did nuclear. Hydro, wind and solar continued to increase.

The 5 year mean (or ‘average’) absolute change of fossil fuel electricity generation has been declining since around 2015, and that from low-carbon fuels has been increasing since around 2012 (refer to the black lines in the middle row of chart 7).

Over the past 5 years, the mean change of coal fired has declined to zero, showing expansion has paused or ceased; large additions in 2017 and 2018 have been roughly matched by large declines in 2019 and 2020 (see red line in the middle row of chart 8).

Gas fired electricity declined only during the Global Financial Crisis 6 in 2009, and in 2020 due to COVID-19. Gas typically has had very short doubling times of 10 to 20 years.

Wind and solar electricity grew rapidly, with doubling times of 3 to 5 years, as shown in the bottom row of chart 9.

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BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2018: Two steps forward, one step back

Introducing the 2018 edition of the BP Statistical Review of World Energy, Bob Dudley, BP group chief executive, said: “2017 was a year where structural forces in the energy market continued to push forward the transition to a lower carbon economy, but where cyclical factors have reversed or slowed some of the gains from prior years. These factors, combined with rising demand for energy, has resulted in a material increase in carbon emissions following three years of little or no growth.”

Data published in the Review – the 67th annual edition – show that:

“This year’s Review looks at the energy mix within the power sector, for the first time, which astonishingly shows that the share of coal in the sector is unchanged from 20 years ago.»

Bob Dudley, group chief executive

In 2017 global energy demand grew by 2.2%, above its 10-year average of 1.7%. This above-trend growth was driven by stronger economic growth in the developed world and a slight slowing in the pace of improvement in energy intensity.

2017 was a strong year for natural gas with consumption up 3% and production up 4% – the fastest growth rates since immediately following the global financial crisis. The single biggest factor fueling global gas consumption was the surge in Chinese gas demand, where consumption increased by over 15%, driven by government environmental policies encouraging coal-to-gas switching.

Renewables grew strongly in 2017, with wind and solar leading the way. Coal consumption was also up, growing for the first time since 2013.

Bob Dudley commented: “This year’s Review looks at the energy mix within the power sector, for the first time, which astonishingly shows that the share of coal in the sector is unchanged from 20 years ago.

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BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2020

(www.MaritimeCyprus.com) The Statistical Review of World Energy analyses data on world energy markets from the prior year. Growth in energy markets slowed in 2019 in line with weaker economic growth and a partial unwinding of some of the one-off factors that boosted energy demand in 2018.

Energy developments:

This slowdown was particularly evident in the US, Russia and India, each of which exhibited unusually strong growth in 2018.

China was the exception, with its energy consumption accelerating in 2019. As a result, China dominated the expansion in global energy markets – contributing the largest increment to demand for each individual source of energy other than natural gas, where it was only narrowly surpassed by the US.

Despite the support from China, all fuels (other than nuclear) grew at a slower rate than their 10-year averages, with coal consumption declining for the fourth time in six years. Nevertheless, renewables still provided a record increment to primary energy and provided the largest contribution (41%) to growth in primary energy, with the level of renewable power generation exceeding nuclear power for the first time.

The slowdown in energy demand growth, combined with a shift in the fuel mix away from coal and toward natural gas and renewables, led to a significant slowing in the growth of carbon emissions, although only partially unwinding the unusually strong increase seen in 2018.

Energy prices fell on the whole, particularly for coal and gas where growth in production outpaced consumption leading to a build-up of inventories. Oil prices were a little lower.

Primary energy and carbon emissions:

Primary energy consumption rose by 1.3% last year, below its 10-year average of 1.6%, and much weaker than the 2.8% growth seen in 2018. By region, consumption fell in North America, Europe and CIS and was below average in South & Central America. Demand growth in Africa, Middle East and Asia was roughly in line with historical averages.

China was by far the biggest individual driver of primary energy growth, accounting for more than three quarters of net global growth. India and Indonesia were the next largest contributors, while the US and Germany posted the largest declines in energy terms.

Looking at energy by fuel, 2019 growth was driven by renewables, followed by natural gas, which together contributed over three quarters of the net increase. The share of both renewables and natural gas in primary energy increased to record highs. Meanwhile, coal consumption declined, with its share in the energy mix falling to its lowest level since 2003.

The combination of slower growth in energy demand and a shift in the fuel mix away from coal and toward natural gas and renewables led to a significant slowdown in the growth of carbon emissions. Emissions rose by 0.5%, although slower than their 10-year average, it only partially unwound the unusually strong growth of 2.1% seen in 2018.

Oil:

Oil consumption grew by 0.9 million barrel per day (b/d), or 0.9% slightly lower than the 10-year average of 1.3%. Growth was led by China, where demand rose by 680,000 b/d, the largest increase in the country’s demand since 2015. Elsewhere in the developing world, growth was below-average, with Iran (180,000 b/d or 10%) the only major exception. OECD demand fell by 290,000 b/d, the first decline since 2014.

Natural Gas:

Global natural gas consumption growth averaged 2% in 2019, below its 10-year average and down sharply from the exceptional growth seen in 2018 (5.3%). In volume terms, demand grew by 78 billion cubic metres (bcm), led by the US (27 bcm) and China (24 bcm).

Coal:

World coal consumption fell by 0.6% (-0.9 EJ), its fourth decline in six years, displaced by natural gas and renewables, particularly in the power sector (see electricity section). As a result, coal’s share in the energy mix fell to 27.0%, its lowest level in 16 years.

Renewables, hydroelectricity and nuclear:

Renewables energy consumption (which includes biofuels and all traded renewable electricity apart from hydro) continued to grow strongly, contributing its largest increase in energy terms (3.2 EJ) on record. This accounted for over 40% of the global growth in primary energy last year, which is larger than any other fuel. As a result, renewables increased its share in the energy mix from 4.5% in 2018 to 5%.

Electricity:

Renewables provided the largest increment to power generation, followed by natural gas while coal generation fell.

For even more details, click on below image to download the  full report:

For the Statistical Review of World Energy 2019, click HERE

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Bp statistical review of world energy 2021

bp today released the 69th annual edition of the bp Statistical Review of World Energy (bp Stats Review)

This year’s edition – which collects and analyses energy data for 2019 – highlights the global energy trends emerging prior to the current Covid-19 pandemic.

While some aspects – such as the continuing strong growth in renewables – offer encouragement that the world is moving onto a more sustainable path, others – including continuing persistent growth in carbon emissions – underline the scale of the challenge for the world to reach net zero.

Introducing the Review, Bernard Looney, bp chief executive officer, says: “As the world emerges from the Covid-19 pandemic, it feels like we are at a pivotal moment.

“Net zero can be achieved by 2050. The zero-carbon energies and technologies exist today – the challenge is to use them at pace and scale, and I remain optimistic that we can make this happen.

“For bp, the pandemic has only reinforced our commitment to our ambition to become a net zero company by 2050 or sooner and to help the world get to net zero, by highlighting both the fragility of our planet and the opportunities it provides to truly build back better.”

Key findings from the bp Stats Review 2020 include:

— Growth in primary energy consumption slowed to 1.3% in 2019, less than half the rate of growth the previous year (2.8%).

— Carbon emissions from energy use grew by 0.5% in 2019, only partially unwinding the unusually strong growth of 2.1% seen in 2018. Average annual growth in carbon emissions over 2018 and 2019 was greater than its 10-year average.

— Renewables contributed their largest increase in energy terms on record (3.2 exajoules). They accounted for over 40% of the global growth in primary energy last year, more than any other fuel. Their share in power generation (10.4%) also surpassed nuclear for the first time.

— Natural gas consumption increased by 2%, well below the exceptional growth seen in 2018, but its share of primary energy still hit a record high (24.2%). Natural gas production rose by 3.4%, buoyed by a record increase in liquefied natural gas exports (54 billion cubic metres).

— Oil consumption grew by a below-average 0.9 million barrels per day (b/d), or 0.9%, while demand for all liquid fuels, including biofuels, topped 100 million b/d for the first time.

— Coal’s share of primary energy fell to its lowest level in 16 years (27%), after consumption fell by 0.6%, led by a sharp drop in OECD demand. However, coal remained the single largest source of energy for power generation, accounting for over 36% of global power.

— China accounted for more than three quarters of net global energy growth, while the US and Germany posted the largest declines.

Spencer Dale, bp chief economist, adds: “Global energy markets have been severely disrupted by the pandemic. bp’s Statistical Review highlights the key energy trends emerging before Covid-19 and I hope it will be a valuable source of information as the world emerges from the pandemic and transitions towards net zero.”

— The bp Statistical Review of World Energy and other material is available online at www.bp.com/statisticalreview
— In addition to the latest edition in PDF format, the website also contains:
— Historical data from 1965 for many sections;
— Additional data for oil, natural gas, coal, hydroelectricity, nuclear energy, electricity and renewables, as well as CO₂ emissions from energy use.

BP (NYSE:BP) is one of the world’s largest oil and gas companies, serving millions of customers every day in more than 80 countries, and employing nearly 85,000 people. BP’s business segments are oil and gas exploration & production, and refining & marketing. In alternative energies, BP has low- and no-carbon wind and biofuels businesses. Through these activities, BP provides fuel for transportation; energy for heat and light; services for motorists; and petrochemicals products for plastics, textiles and food packaging. It has strong positions in many of the world’s hydrocarbons basins and strong market positions in key economies.

Origine : Communiquй bp

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Webinar — The 2021 BP Statistical Review of World Energy

Where

2020 was one of the most tumultuous years for global energy in modern history — what does this mean for the energy transition and the path to net zero? The BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2021 revealed that the COVID-19 pandemic had a dramatic impact on energy markets, with both primary energy demand and carbon emissions falling at their fastest rates since World War II. Nevertheless, renewable energy continued to grow, with solar power recording its largest ever increase.

Hosted by Mark Finley, fellow in energy and global oil at the Baker Institute’s Center for Energy Studies, this webinar featured a presentation of the 2021 Statistical Review’s key findings by Michael Cohen, chief U.S. economist and head of oil analysis at BP. An audience Q&A and discussion followed Cohen’s presentation.

This year marked the 70th anniversary edition of the Statistical Review. Since it was first published in 1952, the Review has provided a constant source of objective, comprehensive — and, most importantly — trusted data to help industry, governments and commentators make sense of developments in global energy markets. A link to the 2021 report can be found here.

Slides from the presentation can be viewed here.

Agenda

10:00 a.m. — Presentation
10:30 a.m. — Q&A

Registration

Registration has closed.

Webinars and events are powered by the contributions of our donors and members. Please consider supporting our work by making a gift or joining a membership group. Learn more here or text BAKER to 243725 to give today.

Featured Speaker

Michael Cohen is the chief U.S. economist and head of oil and refining in BP’s Strategy and Sustainability group. In this role, he is responsible for short-, medium- and long-term oil market and U.S. policy analysis that informs BP’s leadership team, the BP Energy Outlook and the Statistical Review.

Prior to joining BP in May 2019, Cohen was Barclays’ global head of commodities research and was responsible for preparing and delivering differentiated research on commodities markets to Barclays’ global corporate and institutional investor client base. He worked for a decade in the public sector as an economist with the U.S. Energy Information Administration, the Department of Energy’s Office of Policy and International Affairs, and as a senior member of the Oil Markets Division at the International Energy Agency. Prior to government service, Cohen worked on electricity market design for LECG (now Navigant) and as a trading desk analyst for American Electric Power.

Cohen serves as a nonresident fellow at the Colorado School of Mines and frequently lectures on energy, oil markets and geopolitics at several universities. He graduated Phi Beta Kappa with dual undergraduate degrees in business and political science from The Ohio State University and a master’s in international economics from Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

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bp Statistical Review of World Energy 2021

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Bp statistical review of world energy 2021

On October 1, 2021, BP and Forum «Oil & Gas Dialogue» of IMEMO held an the online presentation of BP Statistical Review of World Energy by Spencer Dale, BP Chief Economist.

Webinar was moderated by Natalia Ivanova, Professor, IMEMO.

The Presentation

The event was streamed via Zoom in both English and Russian.

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First news

Institute News

The website of the Russian Council on Foreign Affairs published an article by Nikita Belukhin, «The «Unruly Islands». Greenland and the Faroe Islands Cherish Sovereign Ambitions. Ukrainian events and fears over the future of the Arctic Council certainly put the subject of Denmark’s relations with its autonomous territories on the back burner.

August 19, 2022 in the congress-exhibition center «Patriot» in the town of Kubinka on the fields of the III International Fire and Rescue Congress was a panel discussion «Sustainability of cities in the aspect of climate change: problems and solutions».

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bp: Statistical Review of World Energy

The bp Statistical Review of World Energy highlights the global energy trends emerging prior to the current COVID-19 pandemic.

While some aspects – such as the continuing strong growth in renewables – offer encouragement that the world is moving onto a more sustainable path, others – including continuing persistent growth in carbon emissions – underline the scale of the challenge for the world to reach net zero.

The growth registered in primary energy consumption slowed to 1.3 per cent in 2019, less than half the rate of growth the previous year (2.8 per cent). Carbon emissions from energy use grew by 0.5 per cent in 2019, only partially unwinding the unusually strong growth of 2.1 per cent seen in 2018. Average annual growth in carbon emissions over 2018 and 2019 was greater than its 10-year average.

Renewables contributed their largest increase in energy terms on record as they accounted for over 40 per cent of the global growth in primary energy last year, more than any other fuel. Their share in power generation (10.4 per cent) also surpassed nuclear for the first time. On the other hand, natural gas consumption increased by 2 per cent, well below the exceptional growth seen in 2018, but its share of primary energy still hit a record high (24.2 per cent).

Источник

BP releases 2020 Statistical Review of World Energy

BP has released the 69th annual edition of the BP Statistical Review of World Energy. This year’s edition – which collects and analyses energy data for 2019 – highlights the global energy trends emerging prior to the current Covid-19 pandemic.

While some aspects – such as the continuing strong growth in renewables – offer encouragement that the world is moving onto a more sustainable path, others – including continuing persistent growth in carbon emissions – underline the scale of the challenge for the world to reach net zero.

Introducing the review, Bernard Looney, BP chief executive officer, says: “As the world emerges from the Covid-19 pandemic, it feels like we are at a pivotal moment. Net zero can be achieved by 2050. The zero-carbon energies and technologies exist today – the challenge is to use them at pace and scale, and I remain optimistic that we can make this happen.

“For BP, the pandemic has only reinforced our commitment to our ambition to become a net zero company by 2050 or sooner and to help the world get to net zero, by highlighting both the fragility of our planet and the opportunities it provides to truly build back better.”

Key findings from the BP Statistical Review 2020 include:

Spencer Dale, BP chief economist, adds: “Global energy markets have been severely disrupted by the pandemic. BP’s Statistical Review highlights the key energy trends emerging before Covid-19 and I hope it will be a valuable source of information as the world emerges from the pandemic and transitions towards net zero.”

Источник

Bp statistical review of world energy 2021

Объем мирового потребления первичной энергии (нефть, природный газ, уголь, атомная и гидроэнергия) в прошлом году сократился на 1,1%, что стало первым годовым снижением этого показателя с 1982г. Такие данные приводятся в ежегодном статистическом обзоре, подготовленном британской энергетической компанией BP.

В документе отмечается, что на фоне глобальной рецессии основной спад энергопотребления пришелся на промышленно развитые страны, входящие в Организацию экономического сотрудничества и развития (ОЭСР), а также на страны бывшего Советского Союза. Рост потребления энергии в прошлом году был зафиксирован только в Азиатско-Тихоокеанском регионе (АТР) и на Ближнем Востоке.

Потребление первичной энергии в странах ОЭСР в прошлом году упало на 5%, что стало рекордным снижением в истории «клуба» развитых государств. При этом объемы потребления энергии в организации вернулись к уровням 1998г., отмечается в обзоре BP.

При этом общемировое производство нефти в прошлом году падало даже быстрее, чем потребление. Добыча снизилась на 2 млн барр./день, или 2,6%, что опять же является самым глубоким спадом с 1982г. В частности, добыча черного золота странами ОПЕК снизилась на 7,3%, а производство нефти вне картеля выросло лишь на 0,9%. В том числе объемы производства нефти в США увеличились на 7%, что стало крупнейшим показателем роста среди всех стран в 2009г.

Источник

BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2014

BP has released its Statistical Review of World Energy 2014. There are a lot of things in this report but I am only posting charts on liquid petroleum only. The BP report includes crude oil and NGLs. Their data does not include ethanol or any type of biofuels or process gain. The report actually has data from 1965 but I started all charts from 1990 in order to highlight more recent production. All data is in kb/d.

BP has World liquids output up 557 kb/d in 3013.

USA liquids were up 1,111 kb/d in 2013.

World liquids less USA were down 554 kb/d in 2013.

North America is USA, Canada and Mexico. The increase is USA plus Canada minus Mexico and was up 1,283 kb/d in 2012.

Central and South America was up 19 kb/d but is down 181 kb/d since peaking in 2006.

Europe and Eurasia was up 50 kb/d in 2013 but is down 531 kb/d since peaking in 2017.

Middle East liquids production was down 126 kb/d in 2013.

Africa was down 531 kb/d in 2013 and is down 1,457 kb/d since peaking in 2007.

Asia Pacific was down 138 kb/d in 2013 and is down 221 kb/d since the peak in 2010.

World oil production increased by just 560,000 b/d in 2013, less than half the growth of global consumption.

The US (+1.1 million b/d) recorded the largest growth in the world and the largest annual increment in the country’s history for a second consecutive year. The US accounted for nearly all (96%) of the non-OPEC output increase of 1.2 million b/d (the strongest since 2002) to reach a record 50 million b/d. Increases in Canada (+210,000 b/d) and Russia (+150,000 b/d) offset declines in Syria (-120,000 b/d), the UK and Norway (-80,000 b/d each) and Australia (-70,000 b/d). OPEC output fell by 600,000 b/d, the first decline since 2009, driven by a decline of 520,000 b/d in Libya.

Ron Patterson

88 thoughts to “BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2014”

BP seems to be showing consumption data for fewer and few countries. In any case, they showed that Libya’s production fell from 1.5 mbpd in 2012 to 1.0 mbpd in 2013. The presumed swing producer, Saudi Arabia, did not offer much help. BP shows Saudi net exports falling from 8.6 mbpd in 2012 to 8.4 mbpd in 2013.

The Saudi ECI Ratio (ratio of production to consumption) fell to 3.7, which falls on the predicted ECI glideslope, based on the 2005 to 2012 rate of decline in the Saudi ECI Ratio:

(EIA data for ECI graph)

If the North Dakota data comes out tomorrow I will have a post with that data a few hours later.

Also, the Texas RRC data is due out this week also. I will have a post with that data also.

The EIA has not updated their “International Energy Statistics” in almost two months. The last time it was updated it was for two months. So I guess they are updating it every two months now instead of every month. Pity.

Thanks for the update. I just looked at the 2014 BP Statistical Review and noticed a lot of increases in consumption with very little in the way of increases in production. While overall production did increase, that was mostly due to North America.

Anyhow… Jeffery Brown, it looks like South American and the Middle East Net Oil Exports will continue to decline in 2013. Can you imagine the kind of net oil export declines we will experience by the end of the decade?

Lastly, I wanted to post a link to my article on the GOLD-OIL RATIO:

According to past ratios, the price of gold relative to oil is well below its 4 decade average of 18/1. Currently gold is trading at a 11.2 ratio to the price of oil.

While the Central Banks manipulate the paper prices of precious metals LOWER, they continue push up the Stock and Bond markets HIGHER. Of course, this will end badly.

Aside from a correction in the aftermath of Sept. ’08, it would appear that the GOR has oil in a upward trend since 1980 or so…

Needless to say this is WTI and out of date…

Pretty clear to me that gold is deflating against oil while gold becomes commoditized and now trades at close to the cost for marginal new extraction…

For example, today’s close would give 2.84 gr per barrel of Brent….

While the charts show that Gold is falling against the price of a barrel of Brent Crude, I don’t see it as deflation, rather I see it as manipulation. I am doing a study-report on U.S. Gold Import-Export-Scrap-Mine Supply & its annual deficit-surplus.

One of the data points I am trying to uncover is the 199 million oz of gold held at the New York Fed which 95-98% is foreign owned stock. I believe a large percentage ot of this gold has been leased and over-subscribed into the market over the past 15+ years… thus adding more fictitious supply which depresses the price.

Thus the value of gold is not DEFLATING per say, rather its being kept artificially low s0 the rest of the world is DELUDED into believing (the abortion called) the U.S. Dollar is still worthy of owning.

As I said, deflating against oil, the real alpha asset…

And your data is even more suggestive of that conclusion…

And your data is clearly at odds with the Federal Reserve data set. Pre-BW II, a ratio of 2.6 gr/barrel would give 11.8 barrels per oz, not 20 as you claim….

Moreover, the period over which oil and gold were freely traded starts with the introduction of NYMEX crude futures in the early 80s and using that as a starting point clearly indicates that oil has been slowly deflating against gold…

So how did the Gold/Oil ratio increase in the 1981-2000 period at 19/1 compared to 16/1 during the 1971-1980 period?

Here is the `1981-2000 chart which shows a two decade increase in the Gold/Oil Ratio to 19/1.

This figure based on the London fix and monthly data from the Fed begs to differ:

That is clearly more expensive than your plot shows..

Here
for pre NYMEX data

Here is the London fix

Flax,
I reached the same conclusion, I too went to the St Louis Fed site.

Maybe we ought to suggest to Ron that he make this subject of a future post.

Sorry, I see the mix-up. Here are the DATA POINTS that I used to determine my annual average price for oil.

1) 1861-1944 = WTI Crude
2) 1945-1984 = Arabian Light
3) 1985-2013 = Brent Crude

I don’t go by WTI 1998 price for crude because it doesn’t reflect the true global spot price for oil. If I am going to compare the price of gold with oil, one must use the global benchmark for the period.

Again, Those different benchmarks indicated more the global average price of oil. Using WTI especially since 2011 doesn’t reflect the true global price.

What I call Global Net Exports of oil (GNE*) were at 44 mbpd in 2012. I’m estimating that GNE were down to around 43 mbpd in 2013. Libya had a big impact, but as noted elsewhere, Saudi Arabia seems to have showed a small decline in net exports.

BP shows that Chindia’s Net Imports (CNI) were up to about 9.4 mbpd, which would put Available Net Exports (ANE) at around 33 to 34 mbpd in 2013, versus 35 mbpd in 2012 and 41 mbpd in 2005.

I suspect that the EIA data base will show that the 2013 value for the GNE/CNI Ratio fell along the projected line, based on the 2005 to 2012 rate of decline in the GNE/CNI Ratio. As I have occasionally opined, the implied rates of depletion in the remaining volume of Global CNE (Cumulative Net Exports) and in Available CNE (Cumulative remaining volume of ANE) are enormous.

*Combined net exports from the top 33 net oil exporters in 2005, total petroleum liquids + other liquids, EIA

You need to look at the notes to the spreadsheets.

In the Statistical Review of World Energy, oil production includes C+C+NGL as Ron pointed out in his post.

From the 2013 oil consumption spreadsheet:

” * Inland demand plus international aviation and marine bunkers and refinery fuel and loss. Consumption of fuel ethanol and biodiesel is also included.”

In the Oil production spreadsheet Oil is defined as:

“* Includes crude oil, shale oil, oil sands and NGLs ( the liquid content of natural gas where this is recovered separately). Excludes liquid fuels from other sources such as biomass and coal derivatives.”

Due to the different definitions (along with stock changes), we would not expect the production and consumption numbers to match.

Thanks for the added info. However, I don’t believe it really changes the overall NET OIL EXPORT figure all the much. Basically, we are seeing more domestic consumption from these exporting nations while overall production stays flat or declines.

Sure, we can split hairs on some of the details, but I would imagine the overall net export figure will continue to decline.

At the nitty gritty level of consumption versus production can anybody say whether stocks of crude are being drawn down significantly on a world wide basis?

It’s not manipulation, per se. It’s that physical demand has finally broken western gold derivative markets.

The “price of gold” you quote is the price of a western derivative which can be created in infinite amounts by bullion banks backstopped by the Fed with dollars, and is in fact already levered 100-to-1.

The new BP review is out. What a disappointment. Look at this picture. I opened two windows. The top layer is the 2013 review, the bottom layer is the new 2014 review, so the columns are shifted one year ahead for reasons of easy comparison. It’s about natural gas production. I laid the United Kingdom-numbers right on top of each other. See what happened? The UK just shifted the data 3 years ahead!! They didn’t even bother to cover this fraud up properly. They used exactly the same numbers. They just turned the clock of their decline three years back.

Verwimp – L. F. Buz Ivanhoe on BP statistical methods 1996. Fraud, laziness or what?http://hubbert.mines.edu/news/Ivanhoe_96-1.pdf

This is an excellent link, Thanks.

Kam has this right. The only difference I get is that there are several different conversion factors from GWh to BCM(billions of Cubic meters), I used the BP conversion factor of 11,630 GWh per billion cubic meters of natural gas, but there are several see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Billion_cubic_metres_of_natural_gas

Using the BP conversion factor and the Energy Trends Table 4.2 spreadsheet that Kam gives the link to above, 2013 gross production was 36.47 BCM (424,153 GWh).

Chart below for Gross and net natural gas production from 2000 to 2013.

@Verwimp
Good eye.
Since there are no (zero) negative consequences for institutional dishonesty and cheating anymore why bother putting any effort into it.

You must getting someones attention, certainly a rash of spam lately and some interesting new followers.

It will fade during the next oil price drop (checking watch for the next SPR release threat).

Mr. Patterson, this seems unnecessarily confusing. Do you mean to say that the charts represent crude plus condensate? Can we not break out crude only from their data? I think you are saying that your new term, “liquid petroleum,” is equal to crude plus condensate. Is that correct?

Insofar as we know, no one tracks actual global crude oil (generally defined as 45 or lower API gravity crude oil).

In my opinion, actual global crude oil production probably peaked in 2005, while global gas production–and associated liquids, condensates and natural gas liquids–have so far continued to increase.

In any case, BP defines oil production as crude oil + condensate + natural gas liquids.

No that is not correct. It is crude plus condensate plus natural gas liquids. The “petroleum” part of it means that it is all fossil fuel. The EIA includes ethanol, palm oil and any other biofuel in their “all liquids”. The BP does not.

It seems to me that without the growth from the USA’s shale “boom” the world’s oil production is somewhere between plateauing and decreasing. Only North American production is increasing significantly and we know that the shale sites will soon fall into decline after reaching a peak.

It will be interesting to watch world events from now on. As production will begin to steadily decrease each government will be looking to secure oil for themselves from sites which can still produce large amounts of oil for a fair few years.

There are phases of reaction:

1) Secure supply so that it will flow — wherever.

2) Deny supply to competing consumers, through use of the military should price not achieve national objectives (i.e., the Chinese outbid the US and create lost elections from discomfort).

3) Suppress competing consumption, using military to achieve rapid enemy population decline, where anyone who is a competing consumer will be defined as enemy via whatever manufactured offense.

Oooh, quirk, if your comment is the last one, a reply doesn’t indent.

Mr. Patterson, thanks for the clarification. I was under the impression that the term “condensate” referred to NGL. Any comment about the BP figures for North American liquid petroleum? Doesn’t it seem to be very high in comparison to EIA and IEA publications? Of course, the recent IEA data for U.S. production, which was purported to come from the EIA, I see was retracted, and the real EIA data substituted, which in itself was contradicted by the EIA’s recent revelation about the Monterey Shale play.
Mr. Brown, I understand your position concerning a crude peak in 2005 ( I have been following the “peak oil” issue for many years) and it seems reasonable looking at the many charts that have been produced showing crude production. Now, here, you say that no one provides crude only production figures globally. That makes me hesitant to draw any conclusions about crude production. Does the EIA not publish crude production data for the U.S.? I thought I had been seeing that data in various places, including here. If that is not the case, then I would say we are really in the dark. I also very much doubt that crude production figures are not known, very precisely, within the petroleum industry. It would be difficult to comprehend just how they could do business otherwise.

Natural gas liquids are not really liquids, at least not at room temperature or sea level pressure. Condensate is a liquid at room temperature and sea level pressure. NGLs are ethane, propane and butane, or what I call bottled gas. Condensate a mixture of mostly pentane but also has some lighter and hydrocarbon strings.

I don’t find BPs North American production figures very different from the EIA or the IEAs. Remember they are measuring different things. BP does not include biofuels in their data and the EIA does. The EIA also measures “Crude+Condensate” while BP and the IEA does not.

No the EIA does not have a “crude only” category. Only OPEC has that and then only for OPEC members. No one tracks crude only for non-OPEC nations.

I think you are mistaken about crude production numbers being known very precisely within the industry. Companies know their own production and no one else’s. They all produce all they can and hope for the best.

You are correct that NGL is mostly “bottled gas”, but there is a small component of pentanes in the NGL stream. See

The amount of pentanes plus in 2013 was only 13% so ignoring NGL makes perfect sense in my opinion.

Another consideration is that some of the butane is mixed into gasoline and propane substitutes for home heating oil in rural areas that have no access to natural gas pipelines (parts of the northeast and upper Midwest in the US), the ethane component is mostly used for producing plastic and some chemicals and is not really used for energy.

Actually I just looked at some of the refinery numbers and 500 kb/d of NGL are inputs to refineries, in the form of butane, isobutene, and pentanes plus. Not a lot but by comparison renewable liquids (ethanol and biodiesel) are about 900 kb/d. See

The larger problem is that most agencies (both the IEA and the EIA) do not adjust for the lower energy content of NGL relative to C+C, if NGL is discounted by about 70% at least it is then equivalent on an energy basis.

“You are correct that NGL is mostly “bottled gas”, but….” To be frank, I find this a rather condescending introduction to your post. It implies Ron isn’t aware of what follows which I doubt is true. I mostly enjoy your comments but sometimes find the aura of superiority a tad irritating; this is an example.

Some of us have had a career in the petroleum exploration/development business and we all still have a lot to learn but that doesn’t mean we like being talked down to: Info is great, that’s why we’re here, and I’m the first to admit that you make a major contribution but sometimes………….

My apologies, I did not mean to be condescending.

Ron said,
“NGLs are ethane, propane and butane, or what I call bottled gas.”

As I read the quote above I do not see pentanes plus included.

My understanding is that they are a part of NGL, if that is incorrect I am sorry, along with whatever else you find annoying.

If you would prefer I will not comment at all.

“If you would prefer I will not comment at all.” Please, please, please: That’s not my wish or desire at all. For the most part I love your comments; I have learned a lot from your comments and Ron’s Blog benefits from you comments. OK?

Just one request: Please don’t send me a dictionary definition of TRR because I’ve participated in reservoir calculations on the North Slope, in the North Sea and in China and I really do know what it means (and what it doesn’t mean). [smiling yellow face]

When I talk about TRR it is usually in response to comments which imply that TRR should be ignored entirely. The responses are intended to educate others who may not know as much as you, but I will refrain if you find it as annoying as I find comments to the effect that TRR does not matter at all.

It is correct that TRR matters much less than proved reserves and economically recoverable resources.

I will try not to mention it again and will ignore any future comments about TRR.

Maybe if I say “Hi everyone (except Doug),” if I have anything to say about TRR 🙂

Now that sounds like a compromise. 🙂

My understanding is that they are a part of NGL, if that is incorrect I am sorry, along with whatever else you find annoying.

Yes, technically pentane is definitely a natural gas liquid.
No, pentane is not counted as a natural gas liquid. (Unless it is mixed with lighter hydrocarbon compounds as pressurized gas.)
Pentane, when it is mixed, as it usually is, with heaver hydrocarbon compounds, is called “condensate”.

Bottom line, though pentane is technically a natural gas liquid, the EIA and just about everyone else calls it “condensate” and does not count it as a natural gas liquid.

Edit: The pentane plus means C5+ That is C5 + some C6, C7 and even a little C8 or Octane. They are all mixed when they condense out of natural gas. They are all a liquid at room temperatures and sea level pressure.

I am sorry Dennis, I just assumed you were aware of that fact. Had I known you thought it was counted as a NGL I would have replied to you differently above.

I may in fact be confused about this.

I am aware of the various types of C1 through C8 and so forth. You are absolutely correct that condensate is mostly pentane, I think where one of us may be confused (and it is probably me) is on the distinction between “lease condensate” which condenses out of natural gas at the wellhead and “natural gas plant liquids” which are processed at a separate facility where the non-methane parts are removed from the gross natural gas to produce dry natural gas.

Amongst the products of this process are ethane, butane, isobutene, propane, and pentanes plus.

My understanding is that these pentanes are counted as part of the NGL stream (about 13% of it in 2013).

The numbers for NGL at these two pages are the same which leads me to the conclusion that the pentanes plus (340 kb/d in 2013) are counted as NGL rather than as a part of C+C.

This is indeed confusing. Are there two pentanes, those that condensate out of natural gas and those that are separated at the gas plant?

This is confusing but I am working on another post right now. If you can find anything else on this subject please post it.

Isomers with differing boiling points separating at different stages?

I think that the following chart showing normalized values for Global Gas, Global NGL’s and Global C+C (2005 values = 100%) is the key chart.

Global Crude + Condensate (C+C) production increased at about the same rate as global dry processed gas production from 2002 to 2005, but then we saw a significant divergence between the rates of increase in global gas production and global C+C production from 2005 to 2012, 2.8%/year versus 0.4%/year respectively.

My premise is that condensate, a byproduct of natural gas production, continued to increase at about the same rate as the rate of increase in global gas production, and I suspect that rising condensate production accounted for virtually all of the post-2005 increase in Global C+C production.

This is a great plot…

With the increased cost of fuel, insurance, the cars themselves, increased cost of maintenance, tolls, licensing, etc. being exacerbated by a general lowering of wages and buying power; car ownership and use may fall off due to overall economics. “Money talks, nobody walks” doesn’t work when the money is merely mumbling against a rising tide of cost factors.

The sad part is that I observe a lot of people struggling economically. Their general response is to work more and harder to make more money and have less and less or owe more and more. Truly we are re-entering a time where many owe their soul to the “company store”. The “store” now encompasses a larger context, but the same idea is applicable. Life in a giant hamster wheel that needs to turn faster and faster to get the same effect. Not a desirable end nor the much touted progress.

Except US car sales are essentially booming as sub prime lending moved into autos. Check around. You can buy a car for 0.5% interest. If you move around enough, and the subprimes do, you’ll never have it repossessed when you stop payments.

It’s about 30% of all car buys right now, which is the highest % on record.

Why don’t the lenders care? The funds come from asset backed securities. These are the new version of securitized mortgages. You package up lots of car loans and trade them back and forth and with no mark to market in effect, you just keep it going as long as you can (earning a commission for each transaction).

Interesting, so the bankers have just moved their games to another, smaller, neighborhood. So what happens when this bit of snake oil runs out of steam? Is it big enough to have a major impact or will it just be absorbed into that black hole of government debt?

You apparently are rather well informed about some of the ins and out of the banking and finance industries that are not well known to most people.

I would really appreciate knowing where you get most of your info and if it is necessary to have professional training to understand it in the form you access it.It would not do me any good to read highly technical reports published by the fed for instance since I don’t have the necessary background to understand the jargon and technicalities in such reports.

In 2003, FF accounted for 87% of global primary energy consumption. In 2013, FF accounted for 87% of global primary energy consumption. This is testimony to the absolute failure of energy policies aimed at reducing CO2 emissions.

On the CO2 account, low emissions nuclear power has been replaced by low emissions renewable energy. The actual energy substitutions are a little more complex.

As far as the failure to reduce the rate of growth of carbon emissions, I thought your position was that carbon emissions were of little importance. Is that correct?

Dennis, that is in fact untrue. My scepticism is divided into two parts 1) I’m highly critical of climate science and the IPCC and 2) I am actually cautious on emissions longer term and would for example opt for nuclear in Europe rather than allowing shale gas developments to go ahead. I have little time for the hysterics who see a connection between 400 ppm CO2 and near record cold winter conditions in the USA this past winter.

But I can be highly critical of those plugging an energy policy aimed at reducing global CO2 emissions that is clearly not working. What it is doing in Europe and the UK is destroying landscape, pushing up power bills significantly, spreading energy poverty, making industry less competitive and undermining the stability of the grid and the financial position of the grid operators. Its really quite an achievement to have so much negative impact from a policy that has totally failed.

This would work in the UK. Its one of the cheapest and lowest emissions plans that has been published.

Thank you for the clarification. My (very possibly) incorrect interpretation of earlier work that you had written was that carbon emissions were not a pressing problem. (Return to Olduvai especially.)

I agree that policies to reduce carbon emissions have failed.

I my opinion there are two problems, climate change due to carbon and other green house gas emissions (which I had the mistaken impression that you thought was not a pressing matter due to your low estimate of equilibrium climate sensitivity, similar to the F17 probability level of AR5, or 1.5C for 2x CO2) and the coming peak in fossil fuels. In my mind the solution to both problems is a transition to non-fossil energy sources.

I do not have a problem with nuclear, though I think the costs may be higher than you imagine, I think a combination of solar (placed appropriately), wind, tidal, geothermal, nuclear, and energy efficiency in whatever combination minimizes costs makes the most sense, with a large dose of HVDC transmission to move power from places where there is excess to where it is needed.

Dennis, I have backed away from the Olduvai constraint on emissions meme. Shale that we didn’t know about back then comes into play – I’ve updated my views. And China still manages to dig more coal.

Virtually all the data I look at suggests that climate sensitivity is 1.5˚C or less. Hence I am cautious on emissions – but I don’t run around trying to undermine the viability of the FF industries upon which our well being depends.

As to working out a solution? How did this work in the past? Here I find myself in a quandary. Markets have served us well. But in the UK most of our legacy generating assets were actually built by The State. Do you think it is possible for a handful of unelected technocrats in Brussels to work out the best configuration for European electricity generation in 2020, 20 years ahead of that date? The cost of nuclear is forced up by the principle of “safe as is reasonably practical” as opposed to as “safe as reasonably required”.

Renewables don’t mix with nuclear and a point that Hansen makes is the renewables route locks us into a FF future. Grid scale, affordable and efficient storage changes everything – but I don’t see it coming.

Thanks. When I look at the data and realize that a lot of the heat is being stored in the ocean, I see more like 4 C for equilibrium climate sensitivity. When there is uncertainty ( and I agree that there is a great deal of it in climate science especially on aerosols), it seems wise to err on the side of caution.

On bureaucrats deciding on the energy mix, just raise carbon fees and let the market sort it out if you don’t trust the bureaucrats. The problem with the policy so far is that too many carbon credits were given away.

Energy will have to get more expensive. Nuclear is not the only option, but I don’t think it should be ruled out, that is for individual nations to decide. I like nuclear better than coal and other fossil fuels, but my preference is wind, solar, HVDC transmission, and energy efficiency.

I say we will be lucky to keep it at 4c.
Of course, it will be a moot point at that point.

As the arctic warms plant life will increase consuming more CO2. The Tundra will defrost and grass will start growing again. Ocean plant life will also increase.

Even if we stopped all fossil fuel consumption (never gonna happen!) the Earth will still get much warmer in the future, just not as fast.

Long before we see dramatic CO2 increases we’ll run out of cheap liquid fuels and the global economic will collapse to pre-industrialized levels (before 2040). The biggest threat to the Planet is the 430+ nuclear reactors and there spent fuel pools which is a doomsday machine. Spent fuel pools need constant cooling 7/24/365. If the global grid crashes for more than a week we will set off the doomsday machine as the spent fuel pools start boiling off and start catching fire. Once Liquid fuel shortages begin, nuke plant operators will no longer have the resources needed to properly maintain the plants. Soon or later a tragedy will happen, setting off a cascade events. For instance if the SFP #4 at Fukashima collapsed, it would have rendered most of Japan uninhabitable. Any reactors in the lethal zone could no longer be maintained because anyone in the lethal zone will die. So without manpower on site, the other reactors will also meltdown. This isn’t even considering the chaos when close to 100 Million Japanese would need to flee.

Worry about the raging fire that burning in your backyard (ie the Nuclear Power Doomsday machine) and less about the camp fire that is 2000 miles away (global warming)

Odds also favor WW3, as energy and other strategic resources become difficult and expensive. The precusors to WW1 and WW2 where resources, as industrialized nations competed for resources. Japan use military expansionism to obtain the resources it needs. Europe fought proxy wars in Africa, the Middle East, South America and Asia during the error of Colonialism to obtain resources. This time will not be different. The US attempted to colonize the Middle East (ie Iraq/Afganastan) and initiates proxy wars in the region too. China is in the early stages of Miltary expansionism with it take over of oil/gas resources off the coast of vietnam and the Philipines, and it ongoing dispute with Japan over the senkaku islands. We haven’t even breached Peak Oil yet and they’re beating war drums!

Might want to examine that a bit further, and discard the simple stories and myths:
http://www.news.ucdavis.edu/search/news_detail.lasso?id=9479

cytochromeC Wrote:
“Might want to examine that a bit further, and discard the simple stories and myths: [Link about CO2 harmful to Plants]”

“For the majority of greenhouse crops, net photosynthesis increases as CO2 levels increase from 340–1,000 ppm (parts per million). Most crops show that for any given level of photosynthetically active radiation (PAR), increasing the CO2 level to 1,000 ppm will increase the photosynthesis by about 50% over ambient CO2 levels.”

“atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the Early Carboniferous Period were approximately 1500 ppm”

“Earth’s atmosphere today contains about 380 ppm CO2 (0.038%). Compared to former geologic times, our present atmosphere, like the Late Carboniferous atmosphere, is CO2- impoverished! In the last 600 million years of Earth’s history only the Carboniferous Period and our present age, the Quaternary Period, have witnessed CO2 levels less than 400 ppm.”

“To the consternation of global warming proponents, the Late Ordovician Period was also an Ice Age while at the same time CO2 concentrations then were nearly 12 times higher than today– 4400 ppm.”

[As the environment changes plant life will adapt to the change and take advantage of it. Worry about the Nuclear Power Plant Doomsday machine, not about global warming!]

I am not sure what you mean by “I’m highly critical of climate science and the IPCC”. Even if one chooses to ignore the mountains of evidence for, and very basic physics of global warming, the fact of ocean acidification alone makes the increase in atmospheric CO2 an ecological catastrophe.

“I have little time for the hysterics who see a connection between 400 ppm CO2 and near record cold winter conditions in the USA this past winter.”

Air mass usually contained within the Arctic vortex (winds circulating in the Arctic) is randomly spilling into lower latitudes while warmer air (and water) is moving into the Arctic. If the temperature gradient (difference between the Arctic and tropics) was greater than it is now (due to 400 ppm CO2) cold winter Arctic air would remain in the Arctic and not spill down. So yes there is a connection between climate change brought on by higher CO2 emissions and periods of extreme cold in lower latitudes. It’s not hysterics, just good science.

It was cold here in the states no doubt- but I kept some sites marked that reported the weather in Europe and Asia and it was as much warmer in the far north there as it was colder here and over a comparably large territory.

The black box problem is pretty simple. Heat is coming in faster than it is going out and we are adding insulation all the time.We are witnessing the an average increase in open waters formerly ice covered and the greening of the ground farther north and south and earlier than usual which is reducing the reflection of incoming light.

Maybe things will turn out ok but I am putting my money on it getting hotter every year on average from here on out in terms of human time scales. The heat that is being trapped in the upper layers of the oceans is going to find it’s way into the atmosphere at some point.

I don’t mean that I expect average temperature to set a new record every year. I expect each decade taken as a rolling average will be warmer than the previous one in times to come.

The only real possibility that I can see that would prevent this overall warming would be a big average increase in the global cloud cover.I don’t think any body much is predicting this to come to pass- at least not to such an extent it will counteract the greenhouse effect of more water vapor in the atmosphere. Water vapor is a monster of a greenhouse gas.

Mac, this is a good discussion today, but I simply don’t have time to sit here and answer questions all day. I will dip in and out.

The only real possibility that I can see that would prevent this overall warming would be a big average increase in the global cloud cover.

In fact most of the cyclical historical variance in temperature can be explained by cyclical variance in cloud cover both at the UK and global scales. I say most, since at both Global and UK scales we had to call upon additional CO2 forcing of temperature to explain all the data. That was at a climate sensitivity level of around 1˚C.

I made the chart myself from Global D2 cloud data downloaded from NASA using software that they provide. If you have never seen a chart like this before, you need to ask why not?

And the links in a separate comment in case they get put into the moderation Q.

The link between sunshine and temperature based on UK climate records since 1933
http://euanmearns.com/?p=730

UK temperatures since 1956 – physical models and interpretation of temperature change
http://euanmearns.com/?p=810

We are witnessing the an average increase in open waters formerly ice covered

Mac, on the planet I live on global sea ice anomaly has been largely positive for 18 months or more. What’s more, it is Antarctica that has positive anomalies more than offsetting the negative anomalies in the Arctic. This is important since the Antarctic sea ice lies at lower latitude and will therefore reflect a lot more heat back to space.

The severe Arctic melt backs of 2008 to 2012 appear to be healing. I dare say we may see a new phase of accumulation of multi-year ice.

I don’t recall being told before hand that more CO2 would lead to a meandering Jet Stream that was the principle cause of the cold US winter. It seems to me that every little quirk in the climate is now explained by CO2 and climate science. You may call it good science. I don’t regard it as science at all since this methodology excludes the possibility of natural variance in the climate system. What happened in N America this year has happened many times before.

This paper published by the highly regarded UK MET Hadley centre seeks to explain similar phenomena in Europe by much larger than expected variances in solar spectral output than previously known about.

Solar forcing of winter climate variability in the Northern Hemisphere
Sarah Ineson1*, Adam A. Scaife1, Jeff R. Knight1, James C. Manners1, Nick J. Dunstone1, Lesley J. Gray2 and Joanna D. Haigh3

Nature Geoscince PUBLISHED ONLINE: 9 OCTOBER 2011 | DOI: 10.1038/NGEO1282

I don’t have time to reply to your comments right now and I don’t have time to find links to back up my comments but….

“I don’t recall being told before hand that more CO2 would lead to a meandering Jet Stream that was the principle cause of the cold US winter.” But I do, a paper came out a few years ago predicting exactly what we are now seeing. Just because you are not aware of something does not mean it does not exist.

“What’s more, it is Antarctica that has positive anomalies more than offsetting the negative anomalies in the Arctic.” This statement is simply stunning in how you are taking a fact and completely misinterpreting it.

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Global Electricity Review 2022

Wind and solar, the fastest growing sources of electricity, reach a record ten percent of global electricity in 2021; all clean power is now 38% of supply. But demand growth rebounded, leading to a record rise in coal power and emissions.

Global Programme Lead

30 March 2022 | 24 min read

Highlights

Share of global electricity from wind and solar in 2021

Number of countries with over a tenth of electricity from wind and solar in 2021

Share of global electricity from clean power in 2021

Rise in power sector CO2 emissions

Demand for electricity

Share of demand growth in 2021 met by wind and solar

About

Ember’s third annual Global Electricity Review aims to provide the most transparent and up-to-date overview of changes in the global electricity transition in 2021. We make all of the data freely accessible to allow others to do their own analysis and help speed the switch to clean electricity.

We are witnessing extraordinary events in relation to our global security and global energy systems. We expect a turbulent year ahead. Even as these immediate issues must draw our attention, we know that the longer term, severe threat of climate change is only growing. We will therefore continue to monitor and report on the global impact of the electricity sector and to advocate for an effective and urgent transition to a zero emissions system, which will ultimately also help reduce our energy insecurity and exposure to geopolitical risks.

Our dataset comprises annual power generation and import data for 209 countries covering the period 2000 to 2020. For 2021, we have added data for 75 countries which together represent 93% of global power demand. You can download the data or use our Data Explorer.

This summary report—and the data behind it—is an open resource. Reliable and transparent tracking of the global electricity sector is critical to ensure effective action at the time and scale needed to keep global heating to 1.5 degrees. Alongside this analysis, we offer the comprehensive data set freely available to download or explore via our data explorer.

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Bp statistical review of world energy 2021

On October 1, 2021, BP and Forum «Oil & Gas Dialogue» of IMEMO held an the online presentation of BP Statistical Review of World Energy by Spencer Dale, BP Chief Economist.

Webinar was moderated by Natalia Ivanova, Professor, IMEMO.

The Presentation

The event was streamed via Zoom in both English and Russian.

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Мировая энергетика: опора экономики в условиях пандемии

GLOBAL ENERGY: SUPPORTING THE ECONOMY IN THE FACE OF A PANDEMIC

Ivanov A.S.1,
Matveev I.E.2,
Volkova M.D. 2

В настоящей статье рассмотрены ключевые тенденции развития мировой энергетики, политика основных участников мирового рынка нефти по балансировке рынка, несмотря на такие факторы, как форсирование добычи трудноизвлекаемых залежей нефти и сланцевого газа в США, которые резко снизили свою зависимость от импорта энергоресурсов. Проанализирована ситуация на рынках нефти, газа, угля, атомной и гидроэнергетики, в сфере возобновляемых источников энергии. Показаны успехи и проблемы национальных энергетических хозяйств, использующих традиционные технологии и новые достижения науки и техники, которые направлены на реализацию политики «нулевого роста» потребления топливно-энергетических товаров, снижение выбросов «парниковых» газов в окружающую среду. Приведены сравнительные таблицы по базовым видам энергоносителей, цен на базовые виды топливно-энергетических товаров.

М инувший 2020 год ознаменовался пандемией коронавируса, которая круто изменила характер жизни человечества, ограничила хозяйственную деятельность, сократила производство и потребление, приостановила целые отрасли, включая транспорт, туризм. По состоянию на 20 января 2021 г. в мире кроновирусом с начала 2020 г. заболело более 96 млн чел., из которых уже выздоровело 53 млн чел. За это время скончались 2 млн чел., больше всего жертв пандемии в США – около 402 тыс. чел., в Бразилии – 211 тыс. чел., в Индии – 152 тыс. чел., в Мексике – 142 тыс. чел., в Великобритании – 91 тыс. чел. В России, где усиленно разрабатывалась вакцина, с конца 2020 г. началась вакцинация населения.
Отметим особенность методологии данного исследования. Авторами использованы статистические данные, регулярно публикуемые компанией «British Petroleum» в течение почти семи десятков лет и международными институтами, входящими в группу Всемирного банка.
В период до 2019 г. включительно указанная ТНК применяла единую методику расчетов и представления сведений, что обеспечивало высокий уровень преемственности статистических рядов, позволяло проводить сравнительный анализ данных в ретроспективе на глубину более полувека (до 1965 г. и ранее) с использованием единой размерности – тонны нефтяного эквивалента. В новом обзоре «British Petroleum Statistical Review of World Energy 2020/69 th edition» предложено ориентироваться на другую единицу измерений– эксаджоуль (EJ) по причине, как указано в этом документе, изменения эффективности переработки ископаемого топлива (роста КПД оборудования).
В сложившихся обстоятельствах авторы были вынуждены разработать и применить методику пересчета данных, обеспечивающую использование метода сравнения с приемлемой точностью и, соответственно, позволяющую выявлять, понимать и оценивать тенденции развития ключевых секторов энергетики и мирового энергетического хозяйства в целом с опорой на длинный ряд ретроспективных показателей, выраженных в т н. э. Кроме того, для отражения высокой динамики текущих событий список ведущих производителей и потребителей энергии расширен до 12-ти и более позиций.

Глобальное производство и потребление энергии продолжало расти
В 2018–2019 гг. мировая экономика демонстрировала снижение темпов прироста производства и потребления первичной энергии. Суммарное предложение топливно-энергетических ресурсов (ТЭР) выросло на 1,8 %, спрос – на 1,3 %, что примерно в два раза меньше, чем в начале текущего десятилетия.
Глобальное производство нефти сократилось незначительно – на 0,4 %, газа и углей – выросло соответственно на 3,4 % и 1,5 %.
Потребление нефти увеличилось на 1 %, газа – на 2%, углей – уменьшилось на 0,5 %, энергии на базе ВИЭ – расширилось на 12 %.
В 2019 г. в суммарном производстве энергии удельный вес стран-членов ОЭСР составил 32 %. В структуре глобального энергопотребления аналогичный показатель находился на уровне 40 % (в абсолютном измерении произошло сокращение спроса на 0,8 % к уровню предыдущего года). В развитых экономиках основным спросом пользовались газ и нефть. В расходной части энергобаланса государств, входящих в ОЭСР, на долю жидких и газообразных углеводородов приходилось соответственно 28,8 и 28,6 %. Для углей данный показатель составил 17,7 %, АЭС – около 10 %, ГЭС – примерно 7 %, ВИЭ – немногим более 8 %.
Данные, характеризующие потребление первичной энергии, представлены в табл. 1.

Углеводородный сектор – база мировой системы энергоснабжения
В 2019 г. ведущим производителем нефти являлись США, за год нарастившие добычу почти на 11 %. За ними следовали Россия (рост менее 1 %) и Саудовская Аравия (сокращение на 3,5 %). Обращает на себя внимание ситуация в КНР. В условиях стабильно сокращающейся внутренней добычи жидкого топлива, которая наблюдалась во втором десятилетии, в 2019 г. страна сумела увеличить извлечение жидкого топлива из недр. Возможно, эта тенденция сохранится в ближайшие три–пять лет (табл. 2).
К ведущим потребителям нефти относились США, ЕС, Китай, Индия и Япония, из них развитые экономики сократили спрос на нефть, развивающиеся – увеличили расход данного вида топлива (табл. 3).
В газовом секторе лидерство по добыче принадлежало США. В структуре мирового производства их доля составила 23 %. На втором месте находилась Россия (17 %), за ней следовали Иран (6,1 %), Канада (4,3 %) и КНР (4,5 %).
Особо отметим, что в Китае тенденция роста добычи газа сохранялась на протяжении нескольких последних лет. В 2014 г. производство топлива составило 113 млн т н. э., в 2019 г. – 153 млн т н. э., то есть около 178 млрд куб. м. В ноябре 2020 г. КНР сообщила о расширении сырьевой базы по газообразным углеводородам, в основном за счет запасов на шельфе Южно-Китайского моря.
Данные, характеризующие ситуацию в сфере добычи газа, приведены в табл. 4.
В числе крупнейших потребителей газообразных углеводородов оставались США (22 % глобального потребления), ЕС (12 %), Россия (11 %) и КНР (менее 8 %).
В 2018–2019 гг. в России спрос на газ сократился на 2,2%, в США, Китае и странах Евросоюза – вырос на 3,3, 8,5 и 2,6 % соответственно (табл. 5).
Мировыми лидерами по производству твердого топлива являлись Китай, Индонезия, США и Индия. Потребление углей наиболее масштабно осуществлялось в КНР, Индии, США и объединенной Европе. Соответствующие данные приведены в табл. 6 и 7.
Итак, в конце второго десятилетия США вышли на уровень самодостаточности по газу, а по нефти и углю стали энергоизбыточной экономикой.

В Китае наблюдался рост производства и потребления ископаемого топлива всех видов. В ближайшие 3–5 лет добыча нефти, возможно, останется на текущем уровне, а производство газа будет расти на суше и шельфе Южно-Китайского моря.
В Евросоюзе добыча углеводородов продолжала сокращаться в условиях роста потребления газа, стабилизации спроса на нефть и сокращения потребления углей.
Эти факторы уже изменили мировой энергетический ландшафт и в перспективе будут оказывать на него значительное влияние.

Атомная энергетика и гидроэнергетика – ограничители роста не преодолены
В атомном секторе крупнейшими потребителями электроэнергии оставались США, Евросоюз (половина выработки обеспечена Францией) и Китай. Высокие темпы роста зафиксированы в КНР и Республике Корея, где потребление атомной электроэнергии значительно увеличилось. В Японии наметилось более активное восстановление отрасли, предприятия которой почти 10 лет назад были остановлены из-за катастрофы на АЭС «Фукусима-1» (табл. 8).

Основными факторами, сдерживающими рост атомной энергетики, оставались политический и ресурсный.
В сегменте крупных ГЭС наиболее высокую динамику развития продемонстрировали Турция, Индия и Китай. Указанные страны пока еще не исчерпали природный ресурсный потенциал, в отличие от многих государств и регионов мира, например, объединенной Европы, Японии.
Обращает на себя внимание ситуация в Турции. Страна продолжала реализовывать долгосрочную стратегию «Голубая Родина» (Mavi Vatan), направленную на снижение зависимости от импорта ТЭР. В рамках этого комплексного плана работа велась по многим направлениям. В 2018–2019 гг. производство/потребление гидроэнергии увеличилось на 46 %, а за последние пять лет оно расширилось в два раза. В 2020 г. запасы газа на участках, расположенных в Черном море, выросли на 85 млрд куб.м – до 405 млрд куб. м. Начало добычи газа на месторождении Sakarya намечено на 2023 г.
Крупнейшие потребители гидроэлектроэнергии представлены в табл. 9.

Высокая динамика возобновляемой энергетики
Сфера ВИЭ характеризовалась высокими темпами развития, которые подкреплены глобальной политикой по противодействию изменению климата и масштабной поддержкой со стороны международных финансовых институтов, государственных структур. В 2014–2019 гг. мировое потребление ВИЭ-энергии выросло почти в два раза – с 317 до 630 млн т н. э. По данному показателю ВИЭ-сектор достиг паритета с атомной электроэнергетикой.
В 2019 г. в структуре глобального энергобаланса удельный вес ВИЭ-сектора составил 4,5 %. Крупнейшими производителями и потребителями ВИЭ-энергии являлись страны-члены ЕС, Китай и США. В 2018–2019 гг. сфера ВИЭ наиболее быстрыми темпами развивалась в Японии, Китае, Франции, Бразилии и Индии (табл. 10).

В газовом секторе продолжала расширяться межрегиональная торговля. В 2019 г. реализовано 984 млрд куб. м топлива, что на 5 % больше, чем годом ранее, а в период с 2014 г. по 2019 г. рост составил 28 %.
Обращает на себя внимание тенденция изменения доли торгуемого газа в его мировой добыче. Так, в начале второго десятилетия в каналы международной торговли поступило 33,9 % добытого топлива, в 2014г.– 24,6 %, в 2018 г. – 28,2 %, в 2019 г. – 28,6 %.
В 2019 г. почти достигнут паритет между поставками топлива по трубопроводам и в виде СПГ. С использованием трубопроводного транспорта реализовано 499,4 млрд куб. м (50,7 % суммарного экспорта), в виде СПГ – 485,1 млрд куб. м. В 2018 г. аналогичные показатели составили соответственно 507,9 и 430,6 млрд куб. м, то есть за год поставки газа в сжиженном виде расширились на 12,7%, по трубопроводам – сократились на 1,7 %.
В ближайшей перспективе в межрегиональной торговле с вводом в эксплуатацию новых мощностей по перевалке газа в виде СПГ и соответствующей активной политике стран-покупателей, сектор СПГ может стать преобладающим.
Ведущими импортерами СПГ стали (млрд куб. м):
ЕС – 119,8, Япония – 105,5, КНР – 84,8, Республика Корея – 55,6, Индия – 32,9 и Тайвань – 22,8.
В секторе трубопроводных поставок наиболее крупными покупателями являлись такие субъекты хозяйственной деятельности, как (млрд куб. м): ЕС – 471,3, США – 73,3, Мексика – 50,8, Китай – 47,4, Россия – 26,8, Канада – 24,6, ОАЭ – 19,5.
На ключевом для России рынке стран объединенной Европы импорт газа оценивался в 353,3 млрд куб.м (рост на 11 % по сравнению с аналогичным показателем 2018г.), из них с использованием трубопроводного транспорта поставлено 233,5 млрд куб. м, в виде СПГ – 119,8 млрд куб. м, то есть 34 % суммарного ввоза. На данном направлении просматриваются следующие тенденции: рост ввоза газа в абсолютном выражении, увеличение поставок в виде СПГ и сокращение импорта с использованием магистральных трубопроводов (табл. 13).

Цены на основные виды энергоносителей
Цены на основные виды энергоносителей, снижавшиеся в 2018–2019, в 2020 гг. оставались устойчивыми на средних уровнях.
В 2018–2019 гг. маркерные для международных и мировых рынков цены на основные виды ТЭР снизились. В 2020 г. они оставались на уровнях, относительно приемлемых как для экспортеров, так и импортеров.
Кроме того, на ценовую ситуацию влияла и энергетическая политика. Излишнее укрепление цен на рынке нефти не входило в планы стран, участвующих в договоренностях «ОПЕК плюс», по той причине, что высокие ценовые параметры стимулировали производство в США и других государствах, не присоединившихся к указанному соглашению. Ценовые показатели для нефти марок Brent и российской Urals характеризовались высоким уровнем корреляции.
Наметился рост стоимости уранового концентрата, что свидетельствовало об увеличении спроса ввиду восстановления атомной энергетики Японии и реализации ряда проектов по строительству АЭС (табл. 14).

Усиление климатической повестки в мировой энергетике
В 2019–2020 гг. мировая энергетическая политика представляла набор мер, нацеленных на обеспечение так называемого «нулевого роста» или даже «отрицательного роста» потребления топливно-энергетических товаров (ТЭР), в первую очередь – углеводородов (данные термины постепенно укореняются в глобальном информационном пространстве, их смыслы в рамках данной статьи не рассматриваются).
Со стороны ведущих поставщиков ТЭР продолжалась конкурентная борьба за рынки сбыта с использованием торгово-политических, дипломатических, информационных, военных и других методов.
Нетто-импортеры демонстрировали разнохарактерную рефлексию, заключающуюся в дальнейшем внедрении технологий, позволяющих:
1) компенсировать рост производственных и транспортно-логистических издержек;
2) оптимизировать распределение энергоносителей по каналам международной торговли;
3) повысить эффективность возобновляемой энергетики.
Другими направлениями являлись, во-первых, государственная политика по внедрению и поддержке развития ВИЭ, сфер энергоэффективности и ресурсосбережения. Во-вторых, реализация относительно новой идеи по расширению применения водорода, в первую очередь «зеленого», в меньшей степени – «желтого» и неприемлемого – «красного». В-третьих, разработка новых механизмов и инструментария широкого спектра действия, позволяющих получить дополнительные выгоды в рамках всеобщей борьбы с изменением климата (в их числе – методика ЕС по расчету и порядку взимания углеродного налога).
В 2020 г. на энергетической повестке дня в очередной раз возник вопрос, который сформулирован еще в прошлом веке: является ли текущая ситуация критически важным рубежом, за которым последует необратимый переход ведущих стран и регионов мира на путь низкоуглеродного развития, или серьезные экономические проблемы, низкие цены на топливно-энергетические товары в очередной раз поддержат спрос на ископаемое топливо и снова затормозят внедрение «чистых» технологий.
Серьезных политических оснований для постановки этого вопроса было несколько.
В марте 2020 г. Еврокомиссия подготовила проект закона «О климате», который может юридически закрепить цель по достижению к 2050 г. климатической нейтральности объединенного хозяйства. Принятие закона намечено на 2021 г.
В октябре 2020 г. Еврокомиссия подготовила также доклад о состоянии Энергетического союза ЕС. Основная идея руководства ЕС состоит в развитии хозяйства на базе комплекса мер, направленных на «зеленый» переход и цифровую трансформацию. Еврокомиссия предложила в период до 2030 г. принять повышенные обязательства по сокращению выбросов «парниковых» газов по меньшей мере на 55 % (ранее утвержден показатель в 40 %). Эта более высокая и амбициозная цель потребует внесения соответствующих изменений в законодательство ЕС. В середине 2021 г. Еврокомиссия намерена представить предложения по пересмотру ключевых законов ЕС, касающихся климата и энергетики. Меры по сокращению на 55 % выбросов «парниковых» газов могут привести к сокращению потребления нефти на 1/3, а природного газа – на 1/4 текущего значения.
Кроме того, странам-членам ЕС рекомендовано завершить начатые программы по внедрению «чистых» технологий и обновить к 2023 г. соответствующие планы, рассчитанные на период до 2030 г. [3].
Отметим, что в настоящее время странам-членам Евросоюза предоставляются разносторонние инструменты поддержки по реализации «зеленой сделки». В их числе «Innovation Fund» и «Invest EU», а также программа «Horizon Europe» с бюджетом в 1 млрд евро, которая направлена на решение ключевых проблем энергетической и системной интеграции рынков и включает меры по развитию сухопутных и морских ветропарков, созданию мощных электролизеров, широкому использованию «чистой» энергии на объектах инфраструктуры, в промышленности, строительстве и других секторах экономики.
Иными словами, для восстановления экономики Европейского союза после пандемии и выхода ее на траекторию устойчивого «чистого» роста решающее значение приобретают энергетическая, климатическая и экологическая политики. Введение в их рамках углеродного налога позволит ЕС перенести часть финансового бремени на поставщиков «грязных» ТЭР.
В октябре 2020 г. было опубликовано заявление Си Цзиньпина о стремлении КНР достичь максимума выбросов «парниковых» газов к 2030 г., а углеродной нейтральности хозяйства – к 2060 г. Для решения этой амбициозной задачи стране потребуется коренным образом перестроить национальную энергетическую систему, при этом в расходной части энергобаланса необходимо снизить удельный вес органического топлива с 85 до 15%. Перенастройка системы энергоснабжения потребует значительных инвестиций в сектор ВИЭ (в основном – в солнечную и ветровую энергетику), перевода основной части транспорта (железнодорожного, авиационного и морского) на электрическую тягу, расширения применения «зеленого» водорода.
Подобные процессы неизбежно окажут значительное влияние на национальный импорт нефти и газа, ситуацию на многих мировых и региональных рынках сырьевых товаров.
Эти факторы формируют серьезные риски для России, которая может оказаться между двумя крупными экономическими и политическими центрами (и основными рынками сбыта отечественных углеводородов – ЕС и КНР), избравшими курс на достижение климатической нейтральности. В нашей стране меры реагирования пока не разработаны. Отрасли российского ТЭК продолжали развивать ресурсную базу в традиционных районах добычи и на шельфе арктических морей. Одним из важных элементов стратегии роста объявлены цифровизация и роботизация. В ноябре 2020 г. рассмотрена дорожная карта роботизации нефтегазовой промышленности, но документ был отправлен на доработку. Предполагается, что он будет представлен правительству в первом квартале 2021 г.
В ближайшей перспективе всем участникам мировой энергетики предстоит серьезная работа по оценке факторов и перспектив производства и потребления каждого из видов энергоресурсов для выработки концепций, стратегий и планов рациональных действий.

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Bp statistical review of world energy 2021

On October 1, 2021, BP and Forum «Oil & Gas Dialogue» of IMEMO held an the online presentation of BP Statistical Review of World Energy by Spencer Dale, BP Chief Economist.

Webinar was moderated by Natalia Ivanova, Professor, IMEMO.

The Presentation

The event was streamed via Zoom in both English and Russian.

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The website of the Russian Council on Foreign Affairs published an article by Nikita Belukhin, «The «Unruly Islands». Greenland and the Faroe Islands Cherish Sovereign Ambitions. Ukrainian events and fears over the future of the Arctic Council certainly put the subject of Denmark’s relations with its autonomous territories on the back burner.

August 19, 2022 in the congress-exhibition center «Patriot» in the town of Kubinka on the fields of the III International Fire and Rescue Congress was a panel discussion «Sustainability of cities in the aspect of climate change: problems and solutions».

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Bp statistical review of world energy 2021

On October 1, 2021, BP and Forum «Oil & Gas Dialogue» of IMEMO held an the online presentation of BP Statistical Review of World Energy by Spencer Dale, BP Chief Economist.

Webinar was moderated by Natalia Ivanova, Professor, IMEMO.

The Presentation

The event was streamed via Zoom in both English and Russian.

Comments (0)

No comments

Add comment Отменить ответ

First news

Institute News

The website of the Russian Council on Foreign Affairs published an article by Nikita Belukhin, «The «Unruly Islands». Greenland and the Faroe Islands Cherish Sovereign Ambitions. Ukrainian events and fears over the future of the Arctic Council certainly put the subject of Denmark’s relations with its autonomous territories on the back burner.

August 19, 2022 in the congress-exhibition center «Patriot» in the town of Kubinka on the fields of the III International Fire and Rescue Congress was a panel discussion «Sustainability of cities in the aspect of climate change: problems and solutions».

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Впервые в истории мировая ВИЭ-генерация превысила атомную

В развитии возобновляемой энергетики зафиксирована важная веха. Как следует из ежегодного статистического обзора British Petroleum (Statistical Review of World Energy 2020), в 2019 году мировая ВИЭ-генерация превысила выработку всей мировой атомной энергетики.

“Возобновляемые источники энергии продолжали демонстрировать рекордный рост и обеспечили большую часть прироста спроса (41%) среди первичных энергоресурсов. При этом уровень выработки энергии ВИЭ впервые превышал ее производство атомными станциями”, — говорится в докладе.

Отмечается, что в прошлом году выработка электричества на основе “зеленых” источников (исключая работу гидроэлектростанций) выросла на 13,7% и составила 2805,5 ТВт*ч. При этом производство электроэнергии на АЭС выросло на 3,5% до 2796 ТВт*ч.

Доля возобновляемых источников в мировой электрогенерации составила 10,4%. Это, соответственно, также впервые превысило показатель атомных станций, добавляется в докладе Statistical Review of World Energy 2020.

В России ВИЭ вряд ли победят атомную энергетику

Однако, несмотря на быстрое развитие возобновляемой энергетики во всем мире, в России ВИЭ вряд ли составят серьезную конкуренцию атомной энергетике. Такое мнение высказал академик Российской академии наук (РАН) Сергей Алексеенко.

“В России ВИЭ играют пренебрежимо малую роль, серьезную конкуренцию атому они вряд ли составят, – считает академик. – Ввод ядерных мощностей определяется потребностями экономики, которые можно удовлетворить разными способами, в том числе повышением энергоэффективности”.

Тем более, что в настоящее время в российской атомной энергетике началась технологическая революция. Легендарные и супернадежные реакторы-миллионики (ВВЭР-1000) уходят в прошлое. Сейчас наступает эра суперсовременных энергоблоков поколения “3+” мощностью 1,2 ГВт. Первый из них был установлен в 2018 году на Ленинградской АЭС-2. :///

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BP Statistical Review of World Energy: Тренды цена-добыча кобальта и лития

По данным BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2018

Данные по ценам кобальта и лития с 2000 г., по добыче этих металлов с 1995 г.
Вполне достаточный набор данных, чтобы построить тренды.
Есть только одна особенность: появление в первой половине 2000-х нового крупного потребителя, что затрудняет прогноз по кобальту, но почти никак не повлияло на литий.

Кобальт

Литий

С литием все очень просто: всего два явных выброса: 2000 и 2009 годы.
Коэффициент детерминации тренда очень большой, можно грубо считать, что нашли функцию «цена-добыча».
Если по литию сравнить 2000 год с 2017 годом, то цена выросла в 2.7 раза, а добыча в 3.1 раза. Грубо говоря рост добычи в N раз требует роста цены в 0.86N.
Это более благоприятная оценка, чем тренд по 2001-2017 годам

При прогнозе добычи по диаграммам не забываем о «Парадоксе Гибсона» (корреляция процентных ставок и цен) https://aftershock.news/?q=node/581858

10-03-2018
Его добыча в прошлом году составила порядка 35 000-38 000 тонн. 40% добываемого металла идет на производство аккумуляторов, 26% используется при изготовлении керамики и стекла, 13% приходится на выпуск смазочных материалов, 7% применяется в металлургии, 4% — в выпуске систем кондиционирования, по 3% используются в медицине и при производстве полимеров.

На сегодняшний день подтверждено 14 млн тонн запасов лития. Его добыча в прошлом году составила порядка 35 000-38 000 тонн. 40% добываемого металла идет на производство аккумуляторов, 26% используется при изготовлении керамики и стекла, 13% приходится на выпуск смазочных материалов, 7% применяется в металлургии, 4% — в выпуске систем кондиционирования, по 3% используются в медицине и при производстве полимеров. Соответственно, драйверами роста это сырье обеспечивает производство аккумуляторов, керамики и стекла. Объемы выпуска керамики и стекла, по некоторым оценкам, будут увеличиваться не больше чем на 6-8% в год, поэтому основным для анализа перспектив лития остается рынок аккумуляторов для мелких, крупных мобильных и стационарных платформ. К мелким мобильным платформам относится бытовая электротехника, мобильные телефоны, ноутбуки и другие подобные устройства. В стандартной ячейке аккумулятора мощностью 9 Вт содержатся 0,75 грамма лития. Например, в батарейке iPhone 7 содержится 1 грамм этого металла. Из этого становится ясно, почему ранее проблем с энергоресурсом не было: за 2017 год Apple потребила 0,58% мировых объемов добычи. На производство смартфонов по всему миру ушло лишь 2% совокупно добытого лития, а продано было 1,5 млрд таких устройств. Таким образом, этот сегмент не оказывает сколь-нибудь заметного влияния на рынок лития.

Месторождения лития находятся в солончаках. Из них откачивается рассол, который выдерживается на солнце, а затем проходит химическую обработку. Длятся такие проекты в среднем по пять лет. До двух лет уходит на изучение предполагаемого месторождения и создание экономических условий для реализации добычного проекта. Около полутора лет ведутся геологоразведочные работы. Упомянутый способ добычи является самым дешевым, так как требует только больших объемов воды. Однако из-за особенностей почв, из которых добывается литий, обеспечить доступ к воде в необходимом количестве обычно затруднительно.

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